Culture Clash: The Costs and Benefits of Homogeneity

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This paper develops an economic theory of the costs and benefits of corporate culture—in the sense of shared beliefs and values—in order to study the effects of “culture clash” in mergers and acquisitions. I first use a simple analytical framework to show that shared beliefs lead to more delegation, less monitoring, higher utility (or satisfaction), higher execution effort (or motivation), faster coordination, less influence activities, and more communication, but also to less experimentation and less information collection. When two firms that are each internally homogeneous but different from each other merge, the above results translate to specific predictions about how the change in homogeneity will affect firm behavior. This paper’s predictions can also serve more in general as a test for the theory of culture as shared beliefs.

Key words: corporate strategy; culture clash; mergers and acquisitions; corporate culture; performance; differing priors; heterogeneous priors

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1. Introduction

Look behind any disastrous [merger] and the same word keeps popping up—culture. (The Economist 1999, p. 20)

Culture clash—the potentially destructive effects of combining two organizations with different cultures—is often considered a major cause for the failing of mergers and acquisitions (Kelly et al. 1999, Chang et al. 2002). Because the latter are key mechanisms to change a firm’s scope and because their failure is common (Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987, Copeland et al. 1991, Kaplan and Weisbach 1992, Mitchell and Stafford 2000, Shelton 2002), culture clash is an important consideration for corporate strategy. But its importance does not end there. Although less publicized, culture clash has also plagued alliances and long-term market relationships (Park and Ungson 2001). And it provides a unique lens on the performance effects of corporate culture itself and thus culture’s potential to generate a competitive advantage.

This paper draws upon a simple analytical framework to derive a series of specific predictions regarding the positive and negative effects of corporate culture and of (one form of) culture clash in mergers and acquisitions. I start, in particular, from the definition of corporate culture as shared beliefs and values (Schwartz and Davis 1981, Donaldson and Lorsch 1983, Schein 1985, Kotter and Heskett 1992, Nadler and Tushman 1997, Van den Steen 2010b) and formalize this in a simple economic model. In this model, a firm has to choose a course of action or a way of doing things, but its members—who care about the success of the firm—may openly disagree on the best approach.¹ Culture is then defined as the degree to which members have similar beliefs about the best way of doing things.

In a first step, I use this model to systematically derive the effects of shared beliefs and values on organization behavior and performance. The model shows that shared beliefs lead to more delegation, less monitoring, higher utility (or satisfaction), higher execution effort (or motivation), less information collection, less experimentation, faster coordination, less influence activities, and less biased communication. The key intuition for why “culture as homogeneity” is such a pervasive force in this setting is that (1) agency problems arise from differences in objectives; and (2) shared beliefs and values reduce or eliminate such differences in objectives, thus eliminating the agency issues (and their negative and positive consequences) at the root. This link between the general agency problem, on one hand, and corporate culture, on the other hand, is an important underlying insight of this paper. Although the results are formulated in terms of shared beliefs, I will also discuss whether and how the results extend to shared values in the sense of shared private preferences.

¹ Open disagreement, i.e., the fact that players may agree to disagree, implies that players must have differing priors (Aumann 1976). I will discuss this assumption at the end of §2.1.
An interesting and important observation about these results is that the benefits of homogeneity or of a strong culture center around the organization’s efficiency at doing what it does, whereas the costs of homogeneity or a strong culture, i.e., less experimentation and less information collection, center around finding—or not finding—the right thing to do. One way to interpret this is that a strong culture tends to favor exploitation over exploration. It also suggests that the benefits of culture are visible immediately whereas its costs may take more time to show up.

In a second step, I then translate the costs and benefits identified above to the context of mergers and acquisitions. In particular, with corporate culture defined as shared beliefs and values, culture clash is then caused by the merging of two groups that are each internally homogeneous but different from each other (in terms of their beliefs and preferences). This generates, assuming for now that the effects of culture and the reason for the merger are independent, the following effects of culture clash:

1. The overall level of delegation will decrease after a merger. A manager in the merged firm is more likely to delegate if she and her subordinate come from the same premerger firm than if they come from different premerger firms.
2. The overall level of utility and effort (i.e., of satisfaction and motivation) will decrease after a merger. An employee in the merged firm will on average have higher satisfaction and motivation if he and his manager come from the same premerger firm than if they come from different premerger firms.
3. The overall level of information collection (to convince others) will increase after a merger. A subordinate in the merged firm will collect more information (to convince others) when he and his manager come from different premerger firms than when they come from the same premerger firm.
4. The overall level of experimentation will increase after a merger. Two employees in the merged firm are more likely to undertake different actions when they come from different premerger firms than when they come from the same premerger firm.
5. Coordination will take more time after a merger. Two employees in the merged firm will coordinate more quickly when they come from the same premerger firm than when they come from different premerger firms.
6. The overall level of influence activities will increase after a merger. Two employees in the merged firm are more likely to engage in influence activities when they come from different premerger firms than when they come from the same premerger firm.
7. The overall distortion of communication will increase after a merger. A subordinate in the merged firm is more likely to distort communication when he and his manager come from different premerger firms than when they come from the same premerger firm.

This interpretation of culture clash is consistent with the informal observation that employees will (sometimes years) after a merger still refer to a colleague’s premerger origin firm as an explanation for his or her behavior.

It is useful to point out that—beyond their importance in their own right, which is the focus of this paper—these predictions have another important use: they provide readily observable and thus testable predictions for a theory of “culture as shared beliefs.” In particular, one challenge for testing theories of culture is the difficulty of measuring people’s beliefs, which is about as hard as measuring people’s preferences or private benefits. The predictions above get around that issue by using a person’s premerger firm as an indirect indicator for his or her behavior.

By nature, the economic approach in this paper focuses (on purpose) on a specific definition of corporate culture and on a specific set of causal mechanisms. Such a focused approach has both costs and benefits. On the benefits side, it leads to a very transparent analysis and to very specific predictions. On the cost side, the analysis may omit potentially important elements and mechanisms. In particular, an implicit assumption, which cannot be checked on principle but requires further theoretical or empirical analysis, is that the mechanisms in this paper are sufficiently orthogonal to those that are not considered to make such reduced or focused analysis useful. One potential indirect (though not necessarily conclusive) test of this condition is the theory’s predictions themselves: if the assumption is wrong (in a relevant way) then that should cause the predictions to be rejected. I return to this issue in the discussion of the literature. Another caveat is the implicit assumption that the effects of culture clash are independent from the benefits of the merger itself. I will return to this issue in §3.

1.1. The Literature

This paper’s definition of culture as shared beliefs (and preferences) builds on the dominant view of corporate culture in the management literature, which has defined culture as shared assumptions, beliefs, and values (Burns and Stalker 1961, Donaldson and Lorsch 1983, Schein 1985, Kotter and Heskett 1992, 2010 INFORMS Management Science 56(10), pp. 1718–1738, ©2010 INFORMS 1719

> In some cases, it is important to be clear about the dimensions of exploitation and exploration. A firm can, for example, have a strong culture of innovation, thus exploring the product space. But innovation is typically costly and therefore not always optimal. In such cases, firms with a strong culture of innovation will tend to overinnovate rather than explore noninnovation. Such a firm is then an explorer in the product space but an exploiter in the strategy space.
Nadler and Tushman 1997). Relative to this management literature, I start here from a definition of corporate culture that is clearly narrower but very concrete and precise. Although such reduction might leave out important elements, it has the clear benefit that it allows to determine how much of the effects of culture can be accounted for by this more limited definition. And whereas this is really an empirical issue, it is encouraging that the theory is able to generate a wide range of implications and that Van den Steen (2010b)—which uses the same approach to study the origins of culture as shared beliefs—recovered many stylized facts on corporate culture, such as the fact that culture is influenced by the firm’s founder, especially if that founder has strong beliefs, and that culture can persist despite turnover. These observations suggest that this may potentially capture an important part of the issues, at least from a performance perspective.

The economic literature on corporate culture, on the other hand, can be broadly divided into two categories (from the perspective of this paper). The (temporally) first category—which includes Kreps (1990) (and its important interpretation by Hermann 2001), Carrillo and Gromb (1999), and Rob and Zemsky (2002)—defines corporate culture as a particular selected equilibrium in the presence of multiple equilibria. This literature has focused on trying to identify what culture is, but has (as yet) limited empirical predictions. The second category—which includes Crémer (1993), Lazear (1995), and this paper—builds on the dominant view in the psychology and management literature of culture as shared beliefs and values and thus relates corporate culture (directly or indirectly) to shared characteristics of people. This strand of the literature has been more focused on making empirical predictions on the type and strength of culture and on studying the implications of these shared characteristics for, say, equilibrium selection or agency problems. This second category is, at the current time, both broader (because it has many effects beyond equilibrium selection) and more specific (because it actually makes predictions on which equilibrium is more likely to be selected) than the first.

Both the economics and management literature on corporate culture have been rather informal about the costs and benefits of culture, and even more so about the precise mechanisms underlying these costs and benefits. Kotter and Heskett (1992, p. 16), for example, describe some benefits of a strong culture, such as the fact that “employees tend to march to the same drummer” or that “shared values and behaviors make people feel good about working for a firm,” but without being specific about the mechanisms and thus about the conditions when this is more or less likely to happen. Sørensen (2002, p. 70), starting from the observation that culture leads to “greater internal consistency in goals and behaviors,” conjectures and then confirms empirically that firms with a stronger culture have more consistent performance over time. Kreps (1990) claims informally that culture can help with coordination and with protecting employees against abuses by their superiors, but this seems somewhat circular because his definition of culture actually presumes coordination (on an equilibrium). The first explicit formal study of the effects of corporate culture was Crémer’s (1993) result that more shared information leads to better coordination. Hermann (2001) also analyzes effects of corporate culture but from a very different angle than this paper or than the literature in general: he assumes that culture is a technology that lowers a firm’s overall marginal cost but raises its overall fixed cost and then analyzes which firms will adopt culture and how competition in culture will play out. Relative to this literature, the contribution of this paper is both to be more explicit (through its formal approach and its very simple model) and to be more systematic about the costs and benefits of culture, defined explicitly as shared beliefs and values.

In doing so, this paper also builds on, and adds to, the economic literature on agency, which has studied several of the outcomes in this paper in more detail. Both Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Dessein (2002), for example, consider the impact of “congruence of objectives” in their models of delegation and show that managers delegate more when the objectives are more similar. Crawford and Sobel (1982) studied communication between players with different objectives and concluded that communication is more informative when the players’ preferences are more similar. This is closely related to the problems of relying on the information of an interested party (Milgrom and Roberts 1986). Rotemberg and Saloner (1995) and Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) show that different preferences may increase players’ incentives to collect information, although differing beliefs introduce a truly new dimension (Van den Steen 2002). Finally, Crémer (1993) shows that shared information may improve the alignment of actions in a team-theoretic model, which may be interpreted as coordination. Of these contributions, only Crémer (1993) considered the relationship to corporate culture. Although the current paper adds new results to this agency literature, such as the effect of homogeneity on experimentation, on coordination (in a different sense than Crémer 1993), on influence activities, and on the incentives to collect information, its most important contribution here is the fact that it looks at the agency literature from a different angle—by taking homogeneity, or shared beliefs and values, as a key common theme throughout the literature—and that it thus links the agency literature as a whole to the widely
studied phenomenon of corporate culture, thus linking two very extensive literatures. This paper is, to my knowledge, the first to suggest this link between the general agency problem on the one hand and corporate culture on the other.

There is also a (smaller) economic literature on different aspects of leadership and vision and their relationship to homogeneity, but the study of performance effects has essentially been incidental in this literature. Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) show how a manager’s bias gives employees who happen to work on her favored projects incentives to work hard. Van den Steen (2001, 2005) shows how (1) a manager’s beliefs influence her employees’ project choice, thus giving direction and improving coordination; (2) the interaction between beliefs and utility attracts employees with similar beliefs as those of the manager; and (3) the resulting alignment of beliefs increases utility, effort, and coordination. Besley and Ghatak (2005) assume that employees of a certain type (which captures the employees’ sense of mission) get higher private benefits from success when they work with a principal of a similar type and then show that, in equilibrium, there will be assortative matching and employees who are matched with similar-minded principals will—thanks to their intrinsic motivation—have lower-powered extrinsic incentives or work harder for the same incentives. Relative to this literature, the current paper studies a much wider range of costs and benefits of homogeneity and also relates these results to culture clash.

The role of culture clash in mergers and acquisitions, finally, has received considerable attention in the management literature (see Schoenberg 2000, Schweiger and Goulet 2000, and Cartwright and Schoenberg 2006 for reviews and references). Most of this research has focused on the “cultural distance” hypothesis, which says that larger cultural differences should lead to more costs and higher risks in cross-cultural interactions (Hofstede 1980). The empirical results, however, have been inconclusive or even inconsistent (Stahl and Voigt 2004, Teerikangas and Very 2006), which has been attributed to the lack of clarity on what is or should be tested, both in terms of the culture concept and in terms of the outcomes. Most of the research, for example, uses some measure of national culture as the independent variable and focuses on overall performance, instead of more detailed outcomes, as the dependent variable. One way to deal with these issues, as suggested by Teerikangas and Very (2006), is to enrich the analysis, for example by explicitly incorporating the multilevel nature of culture or by explicitly incorporating the dynamic nature of culture clash. This paper follows the alternative approach of trying to simplify rather than to enrich. I focus, in particular, on a very simple notion of corporate culture and study more detailed, lower-level outcomes. Although such an approach reduces the richness of the issues, the hope is that it may give a solid understanding of at least part of the phenomenon. And the first results are definitely encouraging. Relative to this existing management literature on culture clash in mergers and acquisitions, the contribution of this paper is then to systematically derive, by means of a simple formal model, a wide range of results on the effects of culture and culture clash.

The next section introduces the baseline model and studies, in §§2.2–2.8, a series of variations to derive the different effects; §2.9 discusses how the results extend (or not) to the situation where players have differing preferences instead of differing beliefs. Section 3 translates the results to implications for culture clash, and §4 concludes.

## 2. Costs and Benefits of Homogeneity

### 2.1. The Baseline Model

I present here the baseline model, on which I will build, in the next subsections, a number of variations to identify different costs and benefits of homogeneity. This baseline model captures the situation of a group of people who are engaged in a joint project. Whereas one of them is the formal leader or manager, all of them care to some degree about the final success of the project. To keep the exposition focused, I will henceforth assume that this joint project is actually a firm, although the model could also capture, for example, an alliance or long-term market relationship.

Consider thus a firm that consists of a manager, denoted $M$, and $J$ members, denoted 1 through $J$. The firm will face a choice between two mutually exclusive courses of action, or ways of doing things, $a \in \{A, B\}$. For example, action $A$ could be the status quo whereas action $B$ is the use of a new technology or the launch of a new product. Or action $A$ is to punish failure (to keep people focused) whereas action $B$ is to not punish failure (to encourage innovation). Who makes this choice between $A$ and $B$ depends on the effect under study and will thus be specified in the later subsections.

**Actions $A$ and $B$ each pay some profit $Z > 0$ upon success and 0 upon failure and have respective probabilities of success $\rho_A, \rho_B \in [0, 1]$. The actions $A$ and $B$ thus have expected payoffs $Z \rho_A$ and $Z \rho_B$, where $Z$ essentially measures the importance of the decision. The probability of success $\rho_A$ of action $A$ is a random variable $\rho_A \sim U(0, 1)$ and is publicly drawn before the decision. All players will thus agree on the value of $\rho_A$ by the time the choice between $A$ and $B$ is made, as indicated in Figure 1.** This assumption simplifies the exposition and analysis but is not necessary
for the results. The value of \( \rho_B \in [0, 1] \), on the other hand, is unknown but each player has a subjective belief about \( \rho_B \). Let \( r_{B,i} \) be player \( i \)'s expected value for \( \rho_B \). These (prior) beliefs are commonly known and may differ across players. In other words, players can agree to disagree on the success probability of the new product or on the effect of punishing failure. Aumann (1976) shows that such open disagreement requires that players have differing priors. I will discuss this differing priors assumption below.

Each member of the organization, say \( i \), is risk neutral and cares about the firm’s overall payoff. In particular, assume that \( i \) gets a share \( \alpha_i \) of the firm’s payoff. The assumption that employees care about the firm’s success reflects, for example, the fact that their future income within the firm and their future market wages typically depend on their firm’s success.\(^4\) To break ties, I will also assume that when otherwise indifferent, each player chooses or prefers \( A \).

As discussed later, many of the results also seem to obtain when employees do not disagree on the optimal course of action (and care about firm performance) but instead have personal preferences for \( A \) or for \( B \). Such personal preferences over actions can capture, among other things, the players’ values.

2.1.1. Measuring Similarity of Beliefs. Because homogeneity of beliefs is at the core of this analysis, I need a measure for the similarity of two players’ beliefs. To that purpose, I will use the Euclidean distance between the means of the beliefs of \( i \) and \( j \):

\[
\delta_{i,j} = |r_{B,i} - r_{B,j}|.
\]

Apart from being intuitive and well known, this measure is also very effective in the current context because all results can be expressed directly in terms of \( \delta_{i,j} \). Moreover, it turns out that the probability that players \( i \) and \( j \) undertake the same action is \((1 - \delta_{i,j})\), so that this measure fits well with the idea of culture as “the way we do things around here.” This establishes a direct equivalence with the measure used in Van den Steen (2010b).

2.1.2. The Differing Priors Assumption. The model assumes that people can openly disagree, i.e., they can agree to disagree, which requires players to have differing priors (Aumann 1976).\(^5\)

The assumption of (unbiased) differing priors captures the fact that people may have different “mental models,” “belief systems,” or different intuition, which leads people with identical data to draw different conclusions. Consider, for example, a manager’s belief whether a particular person is trustworthy and how that may influence her decision whether to do business with that person; or whether a particular new technology will break through or how a recent development will evolve. These types of issues and the consequent potential for open disagreement is common in organizations, especially for questions of strategy or organizational policy. Indeed, the fundamental role of belief systems or mental models in organizations has been stressed by academic studies of managers and managerial decision making (Donaldson and Lorsch 1983, Schein 1985).\(^6\) This makes differing priors a very natural setup to study organizations and their potential conflicts.

Although the differing priors assumption is not so common in economics, it does have a long tradition with, among others, Arrow (1964), Wilson (1968), Harrison and Kreps (1978), Varian (1989), Morris (1994, 1997), Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), Yildiz (2003), Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), Boot et al. (2006), Guiso et al. (2006), Dixit and Weibull (2007), Geanakoplos (2009), and Van den Steen (2010a). There has been a rapid rise in recent years, in part because of the growing popularity of behavioral economics, which often implicitly assumes differing priors (since it is a very tractable way to model important aspects of bounded rationality). There is also a burgeoning

\(^3\) In most of the paper only the expected value of \( \rho_B \) matters. I will make more specific assumptions when the full distribution matters.

\(^4\) These preferences could be endogenized by allowing the players to contract on compensation, but at the cost of considerable added complexity. Because this does not seem to generate important new insights in the context of this paper and because the exogenous preferences are also of independent importance, I keep it as an exogenous assumption.

\(^5\) The assumption that players have no private information is made for analytical convenience. If players also had private information, they would update their beliefs but disagreement would remain (Morris 1997).

\(^6\) Open disagreement is obviously not limited to organizational or management issues. Most of us strongly believe that the earth revolves around the sun rather than the other way around. There was a time when people believed the opposite equally strongly, and few of us actually have first-hand experience with this phenomenon. We all hold these very strong beliefs “on authority.” Not everyone is equally convinced however, as illustrated by the website http://www.fixedearth.com. Equally surprising to many are the differences in beliefs about evolution (Robinson 2009), even among college-educated adults.
empirical literature such as Chen et al. (2002) or Landier and Thesmar (2009). The logical and epistemic foundations have been discussed in, among others, Morris (1994), Gul (1998), Yildiz (2000), and Van den Steen (2001). Note that the differing priors assumption not only implies that each player believes that he is right and others are wrong but also that each player is aware that these others will often believe the opposite, i.e., that they are right and the focal player is wrong. Although this may seem somewhat puzzling to a rational player, it is the essence of subjective beliefs and of agreeing to disagree: If we did not think we were right, we would have changed our opinion. And casual empiricism indeed suggests that people tend to explain disagreement in terms of how the other is wrong. So people seem to act “as if” they have differing priors. If one interprets the Bayesian model strictly as a perfect positive model of human inference, then differing priors in a Bayesian model may seem like an unattractive combination of assumptions, even though there is nothing in the Bayesian model that excludes the possibility of differing priors. (In particular, the Bayesian model specifies how we use new information but not what beliefs we happen to start from.) If, on the other hand, one interprets the Bayesian model as an “as if” model or as the best local approximation of human inference (while allowing for the possibility of tiny deviations that do not matter for immediate decisions but that may accumulate over time), then differing priors are perfectly consistent.

A closely related issue is where such differing priors would come from in a Bayesian framework. Corresponding to the two perspectives just mentioned, there are two ways to think about this. Because the prior for this game is a posterior from earlier updating, many forms of bounded rationality (of which the player is not aware) will lead to differing priors, even when starting from a common prior. Unconsciously forgetting some of the data used to update beliefs, for example, would do. This approach implicitly assumes that deviations from rationality are sufficiently small to use the Bayesian model as a local approximation, but also sufficiently large to lead over time to differing priors as the starting point. A second—more philosophical and more controversial—argument is that people may simply be born with differing priors: in the absence of information there is no reason to agree and priors are just primitives of a model. In that view, differing priors do not contradict (in any way) perfect rationality. In this paper, I am agnostic about the source of the disagreement and just explore its consequences.

A final question is why players do not simply discuss and collect new data until they reach agreement. The choice here is essentially a time and cost trade-off, and in many cases persuasion or discussion is just not the right option. In particular, many important beliefs are deeply engrained and difficult to change, whereas further data collection may be prohibitively costly and time consuming. Moreover, the process of convergence of beliefs is more complex than it may seem at first. So it will often be more effective to have someone make the decision rather than to try to reach consensus. Imagine the deadlock if a dean or CEO could only make a decision if there is full and true unanimity in the organization.

I will return to the role of differing priors in this particular context in §2.9, where I discuss how differing priors and private benefits relate. I now turn to the analysis of the different effects of homogeneity in such a context, starting with delegation and monitoring.

2.2. Delegation and Monitoring
Delegation is, to the first order, a trade-off between losing personal control over the decision and having the most appropriate person make the decision. The cost of losing personal control is that, because of differing priors or preferences, the delegee may choose a different action than the delegator would. The gain from delegating the decision to the most appropriate person can take different forms. For example, Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Van den Steen (2006) show that delegation may increase, respectively, the incentives to collect information and the incentives to implement or execute the project, whereas Dessein (2002) considers the case that the delegee has more information. The simplest motivation is actually that decision making takes time and effort, especially if follow-up is necessary to make sure the decision gets implemented. If lower level employees have a lower (opportunity) cost of time and effort, then it is efficient to delegate. To capture that latter situation, I will

7Although in most cases more data tend to lead to convergence, this is definitely not guaranteed in a setting with differing priors. There are indeed both empirical (Lord et al. 1979) and theoretical (Diaconis and Freedman 1986, Acemoglu et al. 2008) reasons why that may not be the case. Acemoglu et al. (2008) show, for example, how potential disagreement over the interpretation of new information is sufficient to prevent convergence. (Note that beliefs in a Bayesian model are specified over states of the world and that a state is a full description of the world. This includes beliefs over the meaning of any potential future signals.) The psychology literature on polarization shows empirically how differential reading of identical information may sometimes lead to divergence. This does not mean that convergence will not happen, only that it is a more difficult process than often imagined. This will particularly be the case when the disagreement derives from different “mental models” or “world views,” because these often imply different interpretation of data.
simply assume here that centralization of the decision causes an exogenously specified cost \( c_e \geq 0 \) to the manager.\(^8\)

Once a manager has delegated the decision, she can still influence the outcome by monitoring the delegate. Such monitoring is an intermediate option between completely centralized and completely decentralized decision making. For simplicity, I assume that monitoring gives the manager with some probability a chance to “correct” the employee, i.e., to make sure that the employee takes the decision that the manager would have taken.

To formalize this delegation and monitoring setting, consider the following variation on the model in §2.1, with timing as in Figure 2. At the start of the game, manager \( M \) decides whether to delegate the decision to employee \( i \) or to keep the decision centralized (at cost \( c_e \) to the manager). If \( M \) decides to delegate, she can still monitor \( i \). In particular, when \( M \) spends personal effort \( e \geq 0 \) on monitoring, at a private cost \( c(e) \), \( M \) can with probability \( P(e) \in [0, 1] \) force \( i \) to take the action that \( M \) believes is best. Assume that \( P(0) = c(0) = 0 \), \( P'(e), c'(e) > 0 \), and \( P'(e) < 0 \leq c'(e) \). To break ties, I also assume that when otherwise indifferent, the manager delegates.

The following proposition then says that the manager will delegate if the employee’s beliefs are sufficiently similar to her own and that, conditional on delegation, the manager will monitor less these employees who have more similar beliefs.

**Proposition 1.** There exists a \( \hat{\delta} \) such that the manager \( M \) delegates to employee \( i \) iff the difference in beliefs \( \delta_{M,i} \leq \hat{\delta} \). When the decision is delegated and for given \( r_{B,M} \), the level of monitoring \( e \) by \( M \) increases in the belief heterogeneity \( \delta_{M,i} \).

**Proof.** According to \( M \), the decision’s expected payoff when making the decision herself is

\[
Z \left[ \int_0^{r_{B, M}} r_{B, M} du + \int_{r_{B, M}}^1 u du \right] = Z \left[ 1 + \frac{r_{B, M}^2}{2} \right].
\]

When the decision is made by \( i \) without monitoring, the decision’s expected payoff according to \( M \) becomes

\[
Z \left[ \int_0^{r_{B, M}^i} r_{B, M}^i du + \int_{r_{B, M}^i}^1 u du \right] = Z \left[ 1 + \frac{r_{B, M}^2}{2} \right] - c(e)
\]

This combines to

\[
\alpha_M Z \left[ \frac{1 + r_{B, M}^2}{2} + (1 - P(e)) \frac{1 + r_{B, M}^2 - \delta_{M,i}^2}{2} \right] - c(e)
\]

when delegating and exerting effort \( e \) at monitoring. Because this expected payoff is supermodular in \( e \) and \( \delta_{M,i} \), the optimal monitoring effort \( \hat{e} \) will increase in \( \delta_{M,i} \). Applying the envelope theorem shows that the payoff from delegation decreases in \( \delta_{M,i} \). Because the expected payoff from centralization is

\[
\alpha_M Z \left[ \frac{1 + r_{B, M}^2}{2} - (1 - P(e)) \delta_{M,i}^2 \right] - c(e)
\]

This implies the proposition. □

The intuition for the result is that as the manager and employee have more different beliefs, the employee is more likely to make the wrong choice from the manager’s perspective. Belief differences thus give the manager more reason to keep control, either by not delegating or by monitoring.

It also follows from the proof of Proposition 1 that more important decisions (i.e., decisions with higher \( Z \)) will be less delegated and more monitored. An interesting variation from an empirical point of view is a situation where the manager faces a number of decisions with different impact on profit (i.e., decisions with different \( Z \)) and can choose among a number of employees with different \( \delta_{M,i} \) (where each employee can make, and thus be delegated, only one decision).

**Proposition 2.** The manager will delegate more important decisions to employees with lower \( \delta_{M,i} \), i.e., to employees with more similar beliefs.

**Proof.** This follows immediately from the proof of Proposition 1. □
2.3. Effort and Utility

Culture and culture clash will also affect employees' motivation and satisfaction, i.e., their effort and expected utility. In particular, when an organization needs to choose a course of action and the members of that organization fundamentally disagree on the right course of action, then at least some members will feel that the organization goes down the wrong path. This lowers their expected utility from being part of the organization and will lower their motivation because they will feel that their effort is spent on the wrong project.

To study these ideas formally, consider the model of §2.1 where the decision is always made by the manager \( M \). Let me focus first on the effect of belief differences on expected utility. The following proposition says that employee \( i \)'s expected utility (or satisfaction) decreases with the difference in belief between the employee and the manager.

**Proposition 3.** For a given employee \( i \) with belief \( r_{B,i} \), \( i \)'s expected utility decreases with the difference in belief \( \delta_{M,i} \).

**Proof.** Employee \( i \)'s expected utility is

\[
\alpha_i \left( Z + r^2_{B,i} - \delta^2_{M,i} \right),
\]

which implies the result. \( \square \)

To study the effect of the homogeneity of beliefs on effort (or motivation), consider again the setting of §2.1 with \( M \) as the decision maker. Assume that, simultaneously with \( M \)'s decision, employee \( i \) can spend effort \( e \geq 0 \) on implementing or executing the project, at a private cost \( c(e) \). In particular, let the project payoff now be \( ZQ(c(e))P \). Assume that \( Q(0) \geq 0 \), \( c(0) = 0 \), \( Q'(e) > 0 \), and \( Q''(e) < 0 \leq c''(e) \). Note that effort is assumed to be a complement to the quality of the decision: effort is worth more on a project with high \( \rho_\delta \) than on a project with low \( \rho_\delta \). This reflects the idea of implementation effort or execution effort: implementing a good project has a higher payoff than implementing a bad project.

The following proposition then says that implementation effort increases as beliefs of manager and employee are more similar.

**Proposition 4.** For a given employee \( i \) with belief \( r_{B,i} \), \( i \)'s effort \( e \) decreases in \( \delta_{M,i} \).

**Proof.** Employee \( i \)'s expected utility is now

\[
\alpha_i \left( Q(e)Z + r^2_{B,i} - \delta^2_{M,i} \right) - c(e),
\]

which implies the result by monotone comparative statics (Milgrom and Roberts 1990). \( \square \)

2.4. Information Collection

A first important benefit of differences in beliefs—or open disagreement—is that it makes people (who care about the outcome) collect more information to “convince” the other players. The intuition is that each player expects that, on average, the newly collected data will confirm his or her belief and thus convince the other player, i.e., move the belief of the other player closer to his own (Van den Steen 2002, 2004). This “persuasion” effect is unique to a situation with open disagreement or differing priors and is very different from the effects in influence-type models such as Milgrom and Roberts (1986), Rotemberg and Saloner (1995), or Dewatripont and Tirole (1999).

To see this effect formally, consider again a variation on the model of §2.1 with the manager \( M \) as the decision maker. Employee \( i \) can publicly collect new information at the very start of the game, i.e., prior to the realization of \( \rho_\delta \). Assume in particular that when \( i \) spends effort \( e \geq 0 \) at private cost \( c(e) \), then with probability \( P(e) \in [0,1] \) both \( i \) and \( M \) will observe the outcome of an experiment on \( B \) (which, by nature, follows a binomial distribution with parameter \( \rho_B \)).

As before, assume that \( P(0) = c(0) = 0 \), \( P'(e), c'(e) > 0 \), and \( P''(e) < 0 \leq c''(e) \). To formally analyze the incentive to collect such information, the full distribution of the players’ belief about \( \rho_B \) also needs to be specified. To keep the analysis tractable, I will assume that each player \( j \)'s prior follows a beta distribution with

\[9\] This persuasion effect has, since then, also been studied by Che and Kartik (2009) and Hirsch (2009). The result is also somewhat related to Yildiz (2004).

\[10\] These models rely either on the fact that the players can bias the information collection (by choosing from biased sources or by only reporting favorable information) or on the fact that collecting extra information introduces an element of randomness, which is good if your favorite action is currently lagging.
parameters \((r_{B,i}N, (1 - r_{B,i})N)\). The following proposition then says that employee \(i\)'s effort to collect more information (to convince his manager) increases with the difference in beliefs between himself and his manager.

**Proposition 5.** For a given employee \(i\) with belief \(r_{B,i}\), the effort \(e\) that \(i\) spends on collecting information increases in the level of belief heterogeneity \(\delta_{M,i}\).

**Proof.** Let \(\hat{r}_{B,i}(r_{B,j}, X)\) with \(X \in \{S, F\}\) denote \(j\)'s updated belief after a success (S) or failure (F). With a beta prior (that corresponds to \(N\) observations), it follows that

\[
\hat{r}_{B,i|(r_{B,j}, X)}(S) = \frac{Nr_{B,j} + 1}{N + 1} \quad \text{and} \quad \hat{r}_{B,i|(r_{B,j}, X)}(F) = \frac{Nr_{B,j}}{N + 1}.
\]

To simplify calculations, I will normalize utility by \(\alpha_i Z\). Employee \(i\)'s expected normalized utility upon a success is

\[
\frac{1 + \hat{r}_{B,i|(r_{B,j}, X)}(S) - \hat{r}_{B,j|(r_{B,j}, X)}(S)^2}{2} = \frac{1 + (Nr_{B,j} + 1)^2}{2(N + 1)^2} - \frac{N^2\delta_{M,i}^2}{2(N + 1)^2},
\]

whereas upon a failure it is

\[
\frac{1 + (Nr_{B,j})^2}{2(N + 1)^2} - \frac{N^2\delta_{M,i}^2}{2(N + 1)^2}.
\]

So the normalized expected utility after generating information is (according to \(i\))

\[
r_{B,i}\left[\frac{1}{2} + \frac{(Nr_{B,i})^2}{2(N + 1)^2} - \frac{N^2\delta_{M,i}^2}{2(N + 1)^2}\right] + (1 - r_{B,j})\left[\frac{1}{2} + \frac{(1 - r_{B,j})^2}{2(N + 1)^2} - \frac{N^2\delta_{M,i}^2}{2(N + 1)^2}\right] = \frac{1 - r_{B,i}}{2} + \frac{r_{B,i}^2}{2} + \frac{(1 - r_{B,j})r_{B,j}}{2(N + 1)^2} - \frac{N^2\delta_{M,i}^2}{2(N + 1)^2}.
\]

Without that extra information, the normalized utility would have been

\[
\frac{1}{2} + \frac{r_{B,i}^2}{2} - \frac{\delta_{M,i}^2}{2}.
\]

So the gain from extra information is

\[
\frac{(1 - r_{B,i})r_{B,i}}{2(N + 1)^2} - \frac{N^2\delta_{M,i}^2 + \delta_{M,i}^2}{2(N + 1)^2} \quad \text{or} \quad \frac{(1 - r_{B,i})r_{B,i} + 2N + 1}{2(N + 1)^2} + \frac{N^2\delta_{M,i}^2}{2(N + 1)^2}.
\]

which is strictly positive and strictly increasing in \(\delta_{M,i}\). This proves the proposition. \(\Box\)

The gain from collecting information—derived in the proof—consists of two terms. The first term, which contains the factor \(r_{B,i}(1 - r_{B,i})\), is the benefit from reducing the variance of the beliefs, i.e., the gain from having a more precise estimate. The second term, which contains \(\delta_{M,i}\), is the gain from convincing the other player. In particular, each player believes that he will convince the other because each believes—by definition—that, on average, the data will confirm his view (over the belief of the other player). The gain from this “convincing effect” increases as the players have more different beliefs: there is no gain from convincing someone who already agrees with you.

### 2.5. Experimentation

A second important benefit of having a diversity of beliefs in the organization is that there will be more experimentation.\(^{11}\) Although a full formal analysis of experimentation typically requires a multiperiod model with a larger range of actions, the key point and key mechanism in this paper can actually be captured in this simple one-period setting. In particular, experimentation is essentially about trying different things and learning about the payoffs of different actions. I will show here that when players have more different beliefs, they will indeed experiment more in this sense of trying more different things and learning more about the payoffs of different actions.

To see this formally, consider a variation on the baseline model of §2.1 where two players, \(i\) and \(j\), both simultaneously choose an action, and the overall payoff of the organization is the average of the payoffs of the two actions. Formally, let \(Y_i\) denote the action chosen by player \(i\), then the organization’s payoff is \(Z(\rho_i + \rho_j)/2\).

**Proposition 6.** The expected number of actions tried within one firm increases in the belief heterogeneity \(\delta_{i,j}\).

**Proof.** Because the firm’s payoff increases in both actions’ payoffs and because each player is risk neutral and cares about the organization-wide payoff, each player will simply choose the action that he believes is most likely to be a success. Let, without loss of generality, \(r_{B,i} \leq r_{B,j}\). The probability that the players will choose different actions is then \(\int_{0}^{r_{B,i}} du = \delta_{i,j}\). It follows indeed that the expected number of actions tried increases in \(\delta_{i,j}\). \(\Box\)

In the context of experimentation, one should obviously be very careful about assuming risk neutrality and especially about assuming that players care about organization-wide payoffs. Introducing risk aversion in this model would have two counteracting effects. First, players would find it optimal to choose more

\(^{11}\) I thank Gustavo Manso for the interesting discussions and suggestions on this issue. For an insightful analysis of how incentives interact with experimentation, see Manso (2010).
different actions in order to diversify risk. Second, however, players would also prefer actions with low uncertainty, which pushes toward choosing the better-known action. Both these effects would shift the amount of experimentation but do not seem to affect the comparative static with respect to \( \delta_{ij} \). Assuming that people care about their own payoff rather than the organization-wide payoff, on the other hand, would cause players to free ride on the experimentation of others. Again, my conjecture is that this effect will move the average level of experimentation, but preserve the comparative statics with respect to homogeneity of beliefs identified here. These issues require more formal study.

2.6. Coordination

An important and intriguing conjecture about corporate culture is that firms with a strong culture have an easier time coordinating (Kotter and Heskett 1992). This conjecture obviously moves us back from the costs to the benefits of homogeneity and culture.

The study of coordination is more complex than it may seem at first because coordination can take on many forms and there is no obvious one best way to think about it. In fact, our (formal or empirical) understanding of the coordination problem is limited and there is no consensus on how to analyze it. Partially as a consequence of that, this section will actually suggest a new approach to studying coordination.

One very simple approach to studying coordination is to conceptualize it as the alignment of two actions in a continuous space, as is often done in team theory (Marschak and Radner 1972). The typical formulation is one in which the joint objective function of two players \( i \) and \( j \) has a term \(-(x_i - x_j)^2\) where \( x_i, x_j \in \mathbb{R} \) are the simultaneous action choices of the players. Using such a model, Crémer (1993) shows how shared information can improve alignment. His model could also be used to show that the players’ actions are more aligned when their prior beliefs are more similar, as measured by \( \delta_{ij} \). Although this is a very tractable approach, it has the disadvantage that it can be difficult to match this model with real settings. For example, without the assumption that the cost of miscoordination is convex, which is difficult to defend in many settings, the game tends to have multiple equilibria and the coordination problem just shifts from aligning \( x_i \) and \( x_j \) to coordinating on an equilibrium, i.e., from one coordination problem to a different coordination problem.

I suggest and use here an alternative approach (which, as a side-benefit, can actually deal with some of the issues identified above). I start, in particular, from a noncooperative two-by-two coordination game, as in Figure 3. In this case, two players simultaneously and noncooperatively choose between two possible actions, \( A \) and \( B \). They both strictly prefer to choose the same action, as implied by the expected utility inequalities in Figure 3. It follows that the game has two pure strategy equilibria: \( AA \) and \( BB \). The problem is that the players may have differing beliefs about the payoffs (or different preferences over the equilibria). In particular, player 1 may believe that \( E_1[u_1(AA)] > E_1[u_1(BB)] \), while 2 believes that \( E_2[u_2(AA)] > E_2[u_2(AB)] \). This leads to obvious coordination issues. For example, although player 1 prefers the \( AA \) equilibrium, he may choose \( B \) in anticipation of player 2 choosing \( B \), given that player 2 prefers the \( BB \) equilibrium. But player 2 may make the symmetric reasoning and end up choosing \( A \) instead. After a few tries, however, one would expect players to coordinate on one or the other equilibrium. The overall conjecture is now that coordination is easier if the players’ beliefs are more similar. Analytically, the challenge is that there is no established methodology to measure the “difficulty of coordination” for such noncooperative coordination settings. The purpose of this subsection is to suggest and apply a method to do exactly that: measure the difficulty of coordination when there are multiple equilibria. The approach is based on the experimental and theoretical literature on learning to play equilibria and on equilibrium selection. Whereas the focus of that literature is to determine which equilibrium will be selected, these theories also inform us implicitly about the difficulty of actually reaching the selected equilibrium. I derive on theoretical grounds a measure for the difficulty of coordination that is consistent with both literatures and that is easily tractable. To that purpose, consider the general coordination game in Figure 3 where \( AA \) and \( BB \) are the two equilibria.

My starting point is the theory of learning. Although most models that have been developed in that literature tend to give very similar results in this context, I will focus here for simplicity on models of belief-based learning, which correspond to \( \delta = 1 \) in the experience weighted attraction (EWA) model (Camerer and Ho 1998). In such belief-based learning models, each player tries to form beliefs regarding the other player’s behavior, based on the other’s

![Figure 3 Coordination Game](image-url)
past behavior. A typical example of this approach—which is essentially the basis of my formal analysis—is the following. Each player starts from the belief that the other will play each action with equal probability. Each player then chooses his best response to these beliefs. Upon observing the other player’s action, each player updates his beliefs about what the other will do. When updating, both attach strictly positive and identical weights to their priors. Each player could, for example, assume that his prior belief corresponds to $N$ previous observations of action choices. Given their new beliefs, the players again choose actions and update their beliefs. They continue to do so until they coordinate on an equilibrium. Whether they thus coordinate on the risk-dominant equilibrium as in Figure 4, or the other equilibrium, is essentially the basis of my formal analysis—which increases in the level of belief heterogeneity $\delta_{i,j}$.

**Proposition 7.** The expected time to coordination increases in the level of belief heterogeneity $\delta_{i,j}$.

The expected time to coordination (given that $r_{B,j} > r_{B,i}$) is then

$$
\int_0^{r_{B,i}} 0\,du + \int_{r_{B,i}}^{(r_{B,j}+r_{B,i})/2} \left( \frac{2 + u - r_{B,i}}{2 + r_{B,j} - u} - \frac{2 + r_{B,j} - u}{2 + u - r_{B,j}} \right) \,du + \int_{r_{B,j}}^{1} 0 \,du
\leq 8 \int_2^{1/(2 - r_{B,j})} \frac{1}{v} \,dv - 2(r_{B,i} - r_{B,j})$$

$$
= 8 \log \left( \frac{4}{4 - \delta_{i,j}} \right) - 2\delta_{i,j}
$$

which increases in $\delta_{i,j}$. So it follows that the expected time to coordination increases in $\delta_{i,j}$. The argument for the case with $r_{B,i} < r_{B,j}$ is completely analogous after switching players and actions. □

The intuition for this result is that a smaller difference in beliefs implies that (a) the players are more likely to prefer the same equilibrium, and (b) when they do prefer different equilibria, the players are less likely to have a strong preference for one equilibrium over the other. As a consequence, they are more likely either to coordinate immediately (when...
they prefer the same equilibrium) or to settle quickly (when they prefer different equilibria but neither has a strong preference). Coordination is thus easier with more homogeneous beliefs.

2.7. Influence Activities

The final two results are both about the effect of homogeneity on actions to get one’s way. In particular, when people in an organization disagree on the optimal approach, they will spend time and effort to try to influence decisions in the direction that they believe is best. Such actions are generically called “influence activities” (Milgrom and Roberts 1988). These actions can take the form of biased communication, personal or social pressure, alliances with implicit quid pro quos, etc. Whereas this subsection considers generic influence activities, the next subsection will consider the special case of distorted communication. The key hypothesis here is that the level of influence activities will decrease as beliefs are more homogeneous because people will less often disagree on the optimal approach (and have weak preferences when they do disagree) and thus have less reason to try to influence the course of action.

To study generic influence activities formally, assume that someone in the organization—say employee $j$—will make the action choice and that employee $i$ can affect that action choice by spending effort $e \geq 0$ on “influence activities” at private cost $c(e)$. Assume that $j$ will then undertake $i$’s preferred action with probability $R(e) \in [0, 1]$ and her own preferred action with the complementary probability. As before again, assume that $R(0) = c(0) = 0$, $R'(e), c'(e) > 0$, and $R''(e) < 0 \leq c''(e)$. The timing is indicated in Figure 5.

The following proposition then says that influence activities indeed increase when players have more heterogeneous beliefs.

**Proposition 8.** For a given employee $i$ with belief $r_{B,i}$, $i$’s effort on influence activities increases in the belief heterogeneity $\delta_{i,j}$.

**Proof.** Player $i$’s payoff is

\[
\alpha Z \left[ R(e) \frac{1 + r_{B,i}^2}{2} + (1 - R(e)) \frac{1 + r_{B,i}^2 - \delta_{i,j}^2}{2} \right] - c(e)
\]

so that the result follows by monotone comparative statics. □

2.8. Communication

An important special case of influence activities is distortion in communication. In particular, people may communicate only those pieces of information that move the decision maker’s beliefs closer to their own. It is useful to study this case separately, both because communication distortion is a very important type of influence activity and because focusing on this particular context gives a more precise prediction.

To study this phenomenon, consider the following variation on the baseline model, with timing as in Figure 6. The manager is again the decision maker. With probability $p \in (0, 1)$, however, employee $i$ has private information regarding $\rho_i$. In particular, in that case, employee $i$ observed the outcome of an experiment on $B, \hat{r} \in [0, 1]$, much like in §2.4. (Remember that such experiment follows by nature a binary distribution with parameter $\rho_i$.) I will also again assume that the prior of a player $j$ is the beta distribution with parameters $(r_{B,i} N, (1 - r_{B,i}) N)$. Player $j$ will then update her expected value to $\gamma r_{B,j} + (1 - \gamma) \hat{r}$, where $\gamma = N/(N + 1)$.

Employee $i$ can (costlessly) communicate this information $\hat{r}$, if he has any, and such communication verifiably reveals all the available information. Employee $i$ independently decides whether or not to communicate the information, but absent such communication $M$ does not know whether $i$ actually had private information or not. To simplify the analysis, I solve for a pure strategy equilibrium, which always exist. Finally, I assume for definiteness that in the presence of multiple equilibria the manager can force the equilibrium that she prefers.

The following proposition then says that employee $i$ will more often hide information when he differs more in belief from the manager.

**Proposition 9.** For given $r_{B,M}$, the probability of communication decreases in the belief heterogeneity $\delta_{M,i}$.

**Proof.** The proof is in the appendix. □

Because communication is costless, $i$’s decision to communicate (or not) is completely driven by his attempt to influence $M$’s action choice. As with information collection, there is a trade-off between giving $M$ more information to make a better decision and convincing $M$ by moving her belief more toward
one’s own. Note that \((1 - \gamma)/\gamma\) is a measure of how much information the new signal contains (on a relative basis). If this measure is large then \(i\) will tend to always communicate \(\tilde{r}\): the new signal is then so informative that it swamps any difference in prior beliefs. When this measure is small, however, \(i\) will only communicate \(\tilde{r}\) if the signal moves \(M\)'s belief in \(i\)'s direction: the signal then contains so little information, in a relative sense, that the difference in prior beliefs still dominates and \(i\) then uses the signal to convince \(M\). To see now the effect of homogeneity, note that as the prior beliefs are more different, the importance of differences in prior beliefs increases relative to the importance of new information so that \(i\) is more likely to try to bias his communication and thus less likely to always communicate.

### 2.9. Beliefs vs. Preferences/Values

The results up to this point were all about shared beliefs. A natural question is whether, and if so how far, these results also extend to shared values. To be concrete, I will interpret “values” here in the sense of private benefits, where the assumption that the benefits are private is needed to allow people to disagree in their values.\(^{12}\) Although, as I discuss below, many of the results extend directly (through a mathematical equivalence) to a very particular model with private benefits, that “equivalent” private benefits model is actually not very useful because it captures a setting that is not very interesting or relevant. The results for more relevant models with private benefits are typically more sensitive to the assumptions, especially when information is involved. Nevertheless, for most of the results there seem to exist reasonable models that extend the results to shared values. However, there are also some important predictions that distinguish beliefs and values. I will now discuss these results in more detail.

Let me start with the case where the extension of the results seems straightforward. When the beliefs and payoff functions are completely fixed (i.e., no new information arrives and there is no contracting on payoffs), there is a formal mathematical equivalence between beliefs and one specific form of private preferences. In particular, the following reinterpretation of the model translates the results of Propositions 1, 3, 4, 7, and 8—on delegation, utility and effort, coordination, and generic influence activities—to homogeneity of preferences or shared values (for a very specific context). Let \(r_{A,i} = \rho_A\) and \(r_{B,i}\) denote the private benefits that \(i\) gets when the firm undertakes, respectively, actions \(A\) and \(B\) and let \(\alpha_i = Z = 1\). The actions could be, for example, respectively, a purely profit maximizing and a socially conscious way of implementing a particular project. With this modification, the following results for homogeneity of preferences or “shared values” follow immediately (for this particular setting).\(^{13}\)

- Managers will delegate more, and more important decisions, to employees with more similar preferences or values. When delegating, they also monitor such employees less.
- Utility and implementation effort (i.e., satisfaction and motivation) will be higher in organizations with more homogeneous preferences or values.
- Employees will coordinate more easily when their preferences or values are more similar.
- There will be less influence activities in organizations with more similar preferences or values.

Although this reinterpretation gives a very transparent and direct extension of the results to private benefits, the resulting model has very limited relevance. In particular, it is difficult to find settings of interest where all the effects of an action are private in nature (at least in a corporate context). In nearly all settings, the action choice affects both firm performance and private benefits. Formally, the actions \(A\) and \(B\) also generate—apart from the private benefits—a profit \(Z\pi_A\) and \(Z\pi_B\), respectively, where \(Z\) now captures the importance of the decision. Player \(i\)'s payoff from an action \(X\) is then \(\beta_i Z\pi_X + r_{i,X}\), where \(\beta_i\) is now \(i\)'s share of firm profits. This issue reflects a general limitation of trying to rely on the mathematical equivalence between beliefs and preferences: economics is not about the mathematics but about the meaning of the models. And although the equivalence extends the differing priors results to some private benefits model, it often does not extend the results to a relevant private

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\(^{12}\) The term “values” also gets used for things that are actually more beliefs than preferences. In that case, the results carry over in an obvious way.

\(^{13}\) The proofs for these results can be obtained from the author.
benefits model. Furthermore, beliefs about states of the world mean different things than private preferences. As a consequence, a model specification that is very natural for differing priors may not be very natural for a private benefits context and the other way around. For the results of this paper, now, it is not necessarily obvious that the above-mentioned Propositions 1, 3, 4, 7, and 8 also extend to a setting with both private benefits and residual income. Nevertheless, it does seem quite likely that, for these four propositions, reasonable preference-based models can be found that give similar predictions as differing priors, though more formal analysis is needed to get a definite conclusion.

At the same time, though, there are also (related) predictions that do distinguish priors from preferences. For example, the result of Proposition 2 that more important decisions (in terms of profits) will be delegated more to employees with more similar beliefs does not extend to a setting with both residual income and private benefits. This points to some important differences between beliefs and preferences in this context. First, in a setting with both residual income and private benefits, the effect of culture will be more limited for more important decisions. That is the opposite of the situation with differing priors, where culture often plays a bigger role for more important decisions. Second, pay-for-performance incentives and other outcome-focused concerns neutralize culture based on values but reinforce culture based on beliefs (Van den Steen 2007). The underlying reason for both results is that prior beliefs are about how actions affect profits and thus work through the firm’s payoff, whereas private benefits are by definition about things other than the firm’s payoffs. Another way to state this is that the agency conflict in the differing priors model is generated through the residual income, whereas the agency conflict in the private benefits model is mitigated by the residual income.

Things get further complicated when the players may be able to learn as part of the model because the simple mathematical equivalence then breaks down: (differing) priors get updated with new information whereas private benefits do not change.

Consider first the result on communication. The “equivalent” private benefits model has no automatic place for communication because there is no uncertainty. So we need to augment the private benefits model with some uncertainty. But because this can happen in many ways, the specific way in which this uncertainty is added may now determine whether equivalent results are obtained. For example, the communication result may run in the opposite direction if the uncertainty affects (only) the manager’s private benefit \( r_{B,M} \): \( i \) will communicate only if \( r_{B,i} \) and \( r_{B,M} \) are sufficiently different. Although it seems likely that there exists again a reasonable preference-based result similar to Proposition 9, this requires more formal analysis and will also be more sensitive to the assumptions.

The result on experimentation faces a different but related issue. In particular, although the exact formal result of Proposition 6—that heterogeneity leads players to try different actions—extends to the case with private benefits, the meaning of the result is quite different. With private benefits, these different action choices do not necessarily imply experimentation in the true sense of the word: experimentation means trying new actions in order to reduce uncertainty and there may be no uncertainty in the model. Although one could again throw some uncertainty into the model, this is very different from the differing priors setting where the uncertainty is inherent in the setting. For example, whereas the increase in experimentation improves future performance in the differing priors settings, that is not necessarily the case with private benefits. As before, the formal result thus seems to extend (in some way), but its meaning and implications may be modified.

Finally, there are also results for which the underlying mechanism really depends on differing priors. The persuasion result, for example, is driven by the fact that—by the nature of prior beliefs—each player believes that new information will confirm his view and disprove that of the other: the prior belief is, by the martingale property, also the expectation over all possible signals. So players with differing priors have different beliefs about the future signals they will see, with each player believing that the signal will “confirm” his prior. With common priors, on the contrary, all players have the same beliefs about what signals to expect and the expectation over these signals is (by the martingale property) the common prior, so that neither player believes that new information will somehow persuade the other. This persuasion effect is thus truly unique to differing priors. Although there may be ways to get similar-looking results with private benefits, the underlying mechanism will be different and thus typically also (some of) the empirical predictions.

There are other results that really depend on differing priors (beyond their meaning or implications) in papers such as Van den Steen (2007) or Van den Steen (2010a), where income is contractible. The learning results in Van den Steen (2010b), on the origins of culture, also depend on the differing priors assumption.

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14 It is actually possible to construct examples where the optimal private preferences of the employee are the opposite of the manager’s, but that seems to require assumptions that are as unattractive as those for the “equivalent” model.
Whether it is a good or a bad thing that preferences and priors give similar empirical predictions depends on one’s perspective. From the perspective of a theory of culture, similar empirical predictions are essentially a good thing because it means that “culture as beliefs” and “culture as values” work in the same direction and are thus easier to test and manage. I actually conjecture that most of the basic results (with the exception of information collection) will tend to hold for reasonable preference-based models, so that most of the theory applies to both beliefs and values. I do expect, however, the results for values to be weaker and easier to overturn than for beliefs.

Different empirical predictions, on the other hand, strengthen the case for explicitly considering differing priors. In this sense, the predictions that the importance of the decisions and the presence of incentives weaken the role of culture for values but not for beliefs, make the case for explicitly considering differing priors and suggest that subsuming differing priors by private benefits is at best risky and at worst wrong. Moreover, the differences in interpretation also suggest that it may be important to consider differing priors explicitly.

The reason why I originally focused the baseline model on beliefs rather than preferences or values is twofold. First of all, the belief-based model is more easily reinterpreted in terms of preferences or values than the other way around. Second, the idea that agency problems originate in honest disagreement rather than in private benefits is obviously very appealing in this managerial and organizational context (Donaldson and Lorsch 1983).

3. Mergers and Culture Clash

With all these results in hand, I now return to the motivating research question: How will mergers and acquisitions affect a firm’s performance through the effect of culture clash? The logic for translating the earlier results to the context of mergers and acquisitions is relatively straightforward. In particular, building on the literature on corporate culture (Schein 1985, Kotter and Heskett 1992), Van den Steen (2010b) formally showed that firms will be more homogeneous than society at large, among other things because people prefer to work with others who have similar beliefs and preferences, since such others will “make the right decisions.” Two randomly picked employees of the same firm would thus be more likely to share beliefs than two randomly picked employees from different firms. In other words, firms are internally homogeneous but different from each other.

The earlier results can then be translated on two levels. First, on an individual level, the degree of homogeneity will be larger (within the merged firm) between two people from the same premerger firm than between two people from different premerger firms. This gives predictions for how the behavior of such people will differ—along the lines derived in the different subsections—depending on which premerger firms they belonged to. Second, on an organization-wide level, the overall degree of homogeneity will decrease through the merger. This gives predictions for the average behavior throughout the organization. To make this more concrete, consider the example of delegation. The predictions of the model will be that the average level of delegation will be lower in the merged firm than in the independent firms and that, within the merged firm, a manager is more likely to delegate to an employee from her own premerger firm than to an employee from the other premerger firm. The part of the result that compares average levels of delegation premerger versus post-merger implicitly assumes that the delegation decision is not affected by the merger through channels other than the homogeneity of beliefs. I will return to this assumption after the formal results.

To study this formally, I will embed the variations of §§2.2-2.8 in a simple merger game. The game starts from two firms with an equal number of J employees each. To fix the composition of each firm, imagine the following selection process for the manager and employees of firm k. First, M_k, the manager for firm k, is drawn at random from a population of potential managers with beliefs uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. In other words, M_k’s belief is realized according to r_k,M_k ~ U[0, 1]. This manager will now hire the firm’s J employees. The pool of potential employees also has beliefs uniformly distributed on [0, 1].

As part of the hiring and selection process of a new employee, say j, manager M_k observes this potential employee’s belief b_j. In particular, whether b_j ∈ [0, 0.5] or b_j ∈ (0.5, 1] can be captured. To capture the results of the literature on culture as homogeneity (Schein 1985, Kotter and Heskett 1992, Van den Steen 2010b), I will assume that the manager selects employees who share her belief on B, namely for M_k and employee j, M_k will select potential employees with b_j ∈ [0, 0.5] so that firm k’s employees’ beliefs will be distributed r_k,j ~ U[0, 0.5], and analogously for the other case.15 It is important to note

15This would be the endogenous outcome of a search model in the style of Van den Steen (2010b) with sufficiently low search costs if there was some probability that it is the employee who chooses the action. An alternative specification is to assume that employees of firm k are randomly drawn according to a uniform distribution over the subset S_k = [r_k,M_k - δ, r_k,M_k + δ] ⊆ [0, 1]. This approach, however, leads to corner issues that get analytically quite complex in this case (and hence may require the assumption that S_k is a completely a subset of [0, 1]). The current specification avoids this complication.
that this distribution of (employee and managerial) beliefs is an empirical distribution of prior beliefs and thus contains no information about the true underlying value of $p_B$. In particular, a player will not revise her or his beliefs upon meeting someone with a different prior. By extension, a player will not revise her or his beliefs upon observing the empirical distribution of priors. For the result on experimentation, I also assume that any information about payoffs that is revealed through experimentation is shared within organizations but not across organizations.

The game now consists of two (hyper)stages. In the first (hyper)stage, the two firms can merge. I will assume that merging has some exogenous benefit $V$ (that does not affect any of the subgames in the second stage). To simplify the analysis, I will consider only the cases where $V > Z$ or $V < 0$ so that it is either always in the best interest or never in the best interest of both firms to merge. If the firms merge, the manager of the merged firm is selected at random from the two premerger managers, with each manager being equally likely. The other manager leaves the game. In the second (hyper)stage, one of the variations of §2 is played.

The proposition then makes two comparisons for each setting. First, it compares the average outcome in the merged firm to the outcome in each of the two independent (i.e., nonmerged) firms, i.e., it compares $V > Z$ to the case that $V < 0$. Second, it compares the average outcome in the merged firm conditional on the two players coming from the same premerger firm to the average outcome conditional on the two players coming from different premerger firms. In all these comparisons, the employee(s) are randomly selected among all the relevant firm employees. In particular, I do not allow the manager to select which employee will participate in the interaction. The latter is definitely an interesting venue for further research.

The following proposition then states the results.

**Proposition 10.** The average probability that a manager delegates (in a §2.2 subgame with a randomly selected employee) is higher in each of the independent firms than in the merged firm. The manager of the merged firm is on average more likely to delegate when facing an employee from her own premerger firm than when facing an employee from the other premerger firm.

The average expected utility and effort (in a §2.3 subgame) is lower in the merged firm than in each of the independent firms. In the merged firm, an employee’s utility and effort is on average lower when the employee and the manager are from different premerger firms than when they are from the same premerger firm.

The average expected utility and effort (in a §2.4 subgame) is lower in the merged firm than in each of the independent firms. In the merged firm, the average effort to collect information is lower when the employee and the manager are from the same premerger firm than when they are from different premerger firms.

The expected number of actions tried within one firm (in a §2.5 subgame) is lower in each of the independent firms than in the merged firm. In the merged firm, two employees from the same premerger firm are less likely to undertake different actions than two employees from different premerger firms.

The average expected time to coordination (in a §2.6 subgame) between two randomly selected employees is higher in the merged firm than in each of the independent firms. In the merged firm, the average expected time to coordination is higher when the two involved employees are from different premerger firms than when they are from the same premerger firm.

The average effort on influence activities (in a §2.7 subgame) is higher in the merged firm than in each of the independent firms. In the merged firm, the average effort on influence activities is higher when $i$ and $j$ are from different premerger firms than when they are from the same premerger firm.

The average probability of communication (in a §2.8 subgame) is higher in each of the independent firms than in the merged firm. In the merged firm, the probability of communication is on average higher when the employee and the manager are from the same premerger firm than when they are from different premerger firms.

**Proof.** Consider first the result on delegation. The first part of that result—that the probability of delegation is lower in the merged firm than in each of the independent firms—is implied by the second part—that the manager of the merged firm is on average more likely to delegate when facing an employee from her own premerger firm than when facing an employee from the other premerger firm. To see this, note that the average probability of delegating in each of the independent firms (which are completely symmetric) equals the expected probability of delegating in the merged firm conditional on the manager of the merged firm facing an employee from her own premerger firm (because the settings are on average identical). Furthermore, the average probability


of delegating in the merged firm is a weighted average of the probability of delegating when the manager faces an employee from her own premerger firm and the probability of delegating when the manager faces an employee from the other premerger firm. The result then follows.

For the second part of the result on delegation, remember that the employees of each firm $k$ are drawn either from $S_1 = [0, 0.5)$ when $r_{b,M} \in S_1$ or from $S_2 = (0.5, 1]$ when $r_{b,M} \in S_2$ and that—following Proposition 1—the probability of centralization is an increasing function of $\delta_{M,i}$ (because it is 0 for $\delta_{M,i} \leq \hat{\delta}$ and 1 for $\delta_{M,i} > \hat{\delta}$). It then follows from Lemma 1 that the average probability of centralization (i.e., no delegation) by manager $M_k$ is higher for employees of his own premerger firm than for employees of the other premerger firm and strictly so when the intervals of the two premerger firms differed. That proves the delegation part of the proposition. The proofs of the other parts of the proposition are analogous.

This analysis was considerably simplified by formulating the game in a way that makes the merger decision independent of the eventual second-stage game and the second-stage game independent of the merger.\footnote{I thank Yuk-fai Fong for pointing out this implicit assumption.} Consider first the assumption that the merger is independent of the second-stage games (by the assumption that either $V > Z$ or $V < 0$). Although anticipation of the second-stage game will obviously influence the merger decision, it will only be one of many considerations in that decision. The implicit assumption on the first part is thus that the second-stage game is a small factor relative to these other considerations. Because costs of culture clash, when anticipated, make a merger less likely and benefits make it more likely, the model predictions overestimate costs and underestimate benefits relative to what one should find empirically.

Consider next the assumption that the merger does not affect the second-stage subgames, i.e., that the second-stage games are not affected by whether or not the firm realizes $V$. Before considering some typical ways to relax this assumption, note that all the effects discussed below are about interorganizational comparisons between merged firms and independent firms and not about the intraorganizational comparisons between people of the same premerger firm versus people of different premerger firms (because in both cases $V$ is realized).

A first typical way to relax this assumption is that $V$ is some fixed benefit—such as overhead reduction or elimination of duplicated functions—so that the merger affects the firm’s total profitability but not the variable payoffs of the actions under consideration. In that case, the only possible effect of the merger could be to increase the utilities of employees in the merged firm relative to the independent firms if these utilities depend on overall firm profitability rather than on the payoffs from the action choice.\footnote{Utility could depend on overall profitability if the firm’s survival (and thus the employee’s job) was at risk or if the labor market relies on overall profitability as a signal of the employee’s productivity (and is unable to correct for the merger).} This would weaken (or may even invert) the utility part of Proposition 10 but would leave all other results unchanged. A second way to relax the assumption is that the merger uniformly increases the payoffs of the different actions, i.e., as if $Z$ increased. For example, the merger may increase the firm’s leverage over the distribution channel, which could improve the payoffs from all sales-related actions. This would affect many of the results. Typically, the merger would then first strengthen the results of Proposition 10 for the case of delegation, information collection, and influence activities, but weaken (or even invert) the results for effort and utility, while leaving the results on experimentation, communication, and coordination unchanged. To see why, note, for example, that an increase in $Z$ makes the decision more important and will thus make the principal more reluctant to delegate and more willing to monitor in the merged firm. This effect thus works in the same direction as the one in the proposition. On the other hand, an increase in $Z$ would increase effort and utility and thus work in the opposite direction. Because the results on experimentation, communication, and coordination all depend on comparison of payoffs and because the payoffs are scaled uniformly, these results are not affected. Finally, a third way to relax the assumption is that the merger increases payoffs differentially, with certain payoffs increasing more than others. Although this would probably have even more effects than the uniform case, any additional results seem to depend on the specific assumptions on the payoff changes and thus unlikely to be robust. The most important insight, however, is that the intraorganizational crossperson comparisons, i.e., the comparison between players from the same premerger firms and players from different premerger firms, are robust to such effects because both are affected in similar ways by the merger. Empirically that is very convenient because these intraorganizational comparisons also seem most amenable to empirical analysis.

Another question that is sometimes raised here is the following. After the merger, employees of different origins take different actions. But they already took different actions before the merger. So in what sense did the merger then raise experimentation? The critical assumption in this context is that information (that is gained from trying an action) is shared within...
one firm but not across firms. Under that assumption, the quality of employees’ future decisions depends on the number of actions tried in their firm. The relevant number of actions tried is thus the number per firm. Because the merger indeed increases the number of actions tried per firm, it raises the relevant level of experimentation.

An interesting observation here—which parallels the earlier observation that the benefits of homogeneity, and thus of a strong culture, tend to be more related to exploitation whereas the costs tend to be more related to exploration—is that the costs of culture clash will tend to be felt immediately, by an increase in agency costs, whereas its potential benefits are realized only over the longer term through experimentation and information collection. In particular, culture clash will reduce the (shorter term) operational performance of the firm, but may lead over the longer term to a better fit with the environment. This also suggests that casual observation runs the risk of overestimating the costs relative to the benefits of culture clash (because the benefits will not be observed until much later).

4. Conclusion
This paper identifies a series of specific costs and benefits of homogeneity and uses these results to make concrete and testable predictions regarding the effects of culture clash in mergers and acquisitions.

The surprisingly pervasive nature of “culture as homogeneity”—as identified in this paper—is driven by the fact that any agency issue originates in a difference in objectives between the principal and the agent and that shared beliefs and values will reduce such differences in objectives and thus fundamentally affect each and every type of agency issue, both positive and negative. This observation suggests one simple reason why defining culture in terms of shared beliefs and values can be so powerful.

The paper translates these results to make specific predictions on the effects of culture clash in mergers and acquisitions. An important overall observation is that the costs of culture clash will typically show up immediately and affect mainly the operational efficiency of the merged firms. The benefits of culture clash will take more time to emerge and will affect more the fit with the environment.

The paper clearly omits some important parts of the culture puzzle. Potential issues that come to mind are the role of culture in identity and in influencing one’s preferences. These are interesting venues for further research.

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Appendix
A.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 9. To simplify the analysis, I will again normalize the expected utilities by \( \alpha, \gamma, Z \). I now first determine the optimal communication strategy for player \( i \). Obviously, if \( i \) does not have a private signal, then he cannot communicate it. Condition therefore on \( i \) having a private signal \( \hat{r} \in [0, 1] \).

Note that any time that \( i \) communicates \( \hat{r}, M \) updates her expected value to \( \hat{r}_{B,M} = \gamma \hat{r}_{B,i} + (1 - \gamma) \hat{r} \) so that \( i \)'s expected utility then becomes

\[
U_{i,c} = \frac{1 + (\gamma \hat{r}_{B,i} + (1 - \gamma) \hat{r})^2}{2} - \frac{(\gamma \hat{r}_{B,M} - \gamma \hat{r}_{B,i})^2}{2}.
\]

I will now first argue that it cannot be an equilibrium that \( i \) never communicates (upon receiving a signal). In such equilibrium, \( M \) would not update her beliefs when not receiving a signal and \( i \)'s expected payoff (upon receiving a signal \( \hat{r} \) but not communicating it) would equal

\[
U_{i,nc} = \frac{1 + (\gamma \hat{r}_{B,i} + (1 - \gamma) \hat{r})^2}{2} - \frac{(\gamma \hat{r}_{B,M} - \gamma \hat{r}_{B,i})^2}{2}.
\]

For this to be an equilibrium, this latter expected utility must always be larger than the expected utility from communicating, i.e., it must always be that

\[
U_{i,nc} \geq U_{i,c} \quad \text{or} \quad 0 \geq (1 - \gamma)^2 (\hat{r}_{B,M} - \hat{r})^2 + 2\gamma (1 - \gamma) (\hat{r}_{B,M} - \hat{r}_{B,i}) (\hat{r}_{B,M} - \hat{r}).
\]

To see now that “never communicate” cannot be an equilibrium, note that for any set of parameters, there exists an outcome \( \hat{r} \) that violates this condition, namely, \( \hat{r} = 0 \) when \( \hat{r}_{B,M} \geq \hat{r}_{B,i} \) and \( \hat{r} = 1 \) when \( \hat{r}_{B,M} \leq \hat{r}_{B,i} \).

Consider next the potential equilibrium where \( i \) communicates iff the signal \( \hat{r} = 1 \). Let NC (“no communication”) denote the event that \( i \) does not communicate. Consider now manager \( M \)'s updated belief upon no communication. Using \( Y/N \) to indicate whether the employee does get a signal or not, this becomes

\[
E_M[p_B \ | \ NC] = E_M[p_B \ | \ NC \& Y]P(Y) + E_M[p_B \ | \ NC \& N]P(N) = \gamma \hat{r}_{B,M} P + \hat{r}_{B,M} (1 - p).
\]

I now first argue that this cannot be an equilibrium when \( \hat{r}_{B,M} \geq \hat{r}_{B,i} \) because a player \( i \) with a signal \( \hat{r} = 0 \) will want...
to communicate. To see this, note that this player’s expected utility when communicating equals
\[
\frac{1 + \gamma^2 r_{B,i}^2}{2} - \frac{\gamma^2 (r_{B,M} - r_{B,i})^2}{2}
\]
whereas his expected utility when not communicating equals
\[
\frac{1 + (\gamma r_{B,i} + (1 - \gamma) \hat{r})^2}{2} - \frac{(\gamma r_{B,M} + r_{B,M}(1 - p) - \gamma r_{B,i} - (1 - \gamma) \hat{r})^2}{2}
\]
or
\[
\frac{1 + \gamma^2 r_{B,i}^2}{2} - \frac{\gamma^2 (r_{B,M} - r_{B,i})^2}{2} + (1 - \gamma)^2 (1 - r_{B,M})^2 (1 - p)^2 + 2 \gamma (1 - \gamma) (r_{B,M} - r_{B,i}) (1 - r_{B,M}) (1 - p)
\]
So this player will want to communicate if
\[
\frac{1}{2} (1 - \gamma)^2 r_{B,i}^2 (1 - p)^2 + (1 - \gamma)(r_{B,M} - r_{B,i}) (1 - p) \geq 0,
\]
which is always the case when \(r_{B,M} \geq r_{B,i}\). From this and the fact that “never communicate” cannot be an equilibrium, it follows that in any equilibrium with \(r_{B,M} \geq r_{B,i}\), player \(i\) will always communicate when \(\hat{r} = 0\). A completely analogous argument implies that in any equilibrium with \(r_{B,M} \leq r_{B,i}\), the player \(i\) will always communicate when \(\hat{r} = 1\).

I will now derive the equilibrium. Consider the case when \(r_{B,M} \geq r_{B,i}\). The equilibrium is completely pinned down once it is determined what player \(i\) does upon receiving a signal \(\hat{r} = 1\). Consider first the potential equilibrium where \(i\) communicates iff the signal \(\hat{r} = 0\). Using \(Y/N\) to indicate whether the employee does get a signal or not, \(M\)'s updated belief upon no communication becomes
\[
\]
This will be an equilibrium iff player \(i\) with a \(\hat{r} = 1\) signal prefers not to communicate. His payoff from communicating equals
\[
\frac{1 + (\gamma r_{B,i} + (1 - \gamma) \hat{r})^2}{2} - \frac{\gamma^2 (r_{B,M} - r_{B,i})^2}{2},
\]
whereas his payoff from not communicating equals
\[
\frac{1 + (\gamma r_{B,i} + (1 - \gamma) \hat{r})^2}{2} - \frac{(\gamma r_{B,M} + (1 - \gamma)(p + r_{B,M}(1 - p) - \gamma r_{B,i} - (1 - \gamma) \hat{r})^2}{2}
\]
or
\[
\frac{1 + \gamma^2 r_{B,i}^2}{2} - \frac{\gamma^2 (r_{B,M} - r_{B,i})^2}{2} + (1 - \gamma)^2 (1 - r_{B,M})^2 (1 - p)^2 + 2 \gamma (1 - \gamma) (r_{B,M} - r_{B,i}) (1 - r_{B,M}) (1 - p) \geq 0.
\]
So he prefers not to communicate iff
\[
1 + (\gamma r_{B,i} + (1 - \gamma) \hat{r})^2 - \frac{\gamma^2 (r_{B,M} - r_{B,i})^2}{2}
\]
\[
- \frac{1}{2} \gamma^2 (r_{B,M} - r_{B,i})^2 (1 - p)^2 - 2 \gamma (1 - \gamma) (r_{B,M} - r_{B,i}) (1 - r_{B,M}) (1 - p)
\]
or \(\delta_{M,i} \geq [(1 - \gamma)(1 - r_{B,M})(1 - p)]/2 \gamma\), which is always greater than zero.

So whenever \(\delta_{M,i}\) is sufficiently large in this sense, there exists an equilibrium (for \(r_{B,M} > r_{B,i}\)) where \(i\) communicates iff he gets a signal that \(\hat{r} = 0\).

Consider now the conditions under which there exists an equilibrium where \(i\) always communicates (for \(r_{B,M} > r_{B,i}\)). Note that under such equilibrium, \(M\) infers from no communication that there was also no signal. Consider now a player \(i\) with signal \(\hat{r}\). If he does communicate the signal, his payoff becomes
\[
\frac{1 + (\gamma r_{B,i} + (1 - \gamma) \hat{r})^2}{2} - \frac{\gamma^2 (r_{B,M} - r_{B,i})^2}{2}.
\]
If he does not communicate, his expected utility becomes
\[
1 + (\gamma r_{B,i} + (1 - \gamma) \hat{r})^2 - \frac{r_{B,M} - r_{B,i} - (1 - \gamma) \hat{r})^2}{2}
\]
\[
= 1 + (\gamma r_{B,i} + (1 - \gamma) \hat{r})^2 - \frac{2}{2}
\]
\[
- \frac{1}{2} \gamma^2 (r_{B,M} - r_{B,i})^2 (1 - p)^2 + 2 \gamma (1 - \gamma) (r_{B,M} - r_{B,i}) (1 - r_{B,M}) (1 - p) \geq 0.
\]
Remember now from before that (for \(r_{B,M} > r_{B,i}\)) \(i\) will always communicate \(\hat{r} = 0\). So I only have to consider \(\hat{r} = 1\). In that case, \(i\) prefers to communicate iff
\[
1 + (\gamma r_{B,i} + (1 - \gamma) \hat{r})^2 - \frac{\gamma^2 (r_{B,M} - r_{B,i})^2}{2}
\]
\[
\geq \frac{1 + (\gamma r_{B,i} + (1 - \gamma) \hat{r})^2}{2} - \frac{\gamma^2 (r_{B,M} - r_{B,i})^2}{2} + \frac{2}{2}
\]
\[
- 2 \gamma (1 - \gamma) (r_{B,M} - r_{B,i}) (1 - r_{B,M}) (1 - p) \geq 0.
\]
It follows that \(\delta_{M,i} \geq [(1 - \gamma)(1 - r_{B,M})(1 - p)]/2 \gamma\), which is always greater than zero.

So there is an overlapping region where both are an equilibrium. Given the assumption that the manager is able to force the equilibrium selection that favors him, we have “always communicate” whenever there are multiple equilibria. It follows that “always communicate” is the equilibrium iff \(\delta_{M,i} \leq 2(1 - \gamma)(1 - r_{B,M})/\gamma\) so that communication is indeed more likely when \(\delta_{M,i}\) is smaller.
A.2 Lemma 1
Let $g$ be an increasing function with $g(0) > 0$, $δ_{r,B} = \lvert r_{B,i} - r_{B,j} \rvert$, $M$ be an manager with belief $r_{B,M}$, and $S_{i} = [0, 0.5]$ and $S_{S} = (0.5, 1]$ be two intervals.

**Lemma 1.** If $r_{B,i}$ is drawn from a uniform distribution on $S_{i}$ then $E[g(δ_{r,B},)]$ is strictly smaller when $r_{B,M} \in S_{i}$ than when $r_{B,M} \in S_{S}$. If $r_{B,i}$ and $r_{B,j}$ are drawn from uniform distributions on, respectively, $S_{i}$ and $S_{S}$ then $E[g(δ_{r,B})]$ is strictly smaller when $S_{i} = S_{S}$ than when $S_{i} \neq S_{S}$.

**Proof.** Assume, without loss of generality (because the case with $S_{i}$ is completely symmetric), that $r_{B,i}$ is drawn from a uniform distribution on $S_{i}$.

Pick now one other player $h$ (which can, for now, be the either manager $M$ or an employee) with (fixed) belief $r_{B,h}$. If $r_{B,h} \in S_{i}$ then

$$E[g(δ_{r,h})] = \frac{1}{2} \int_{0}^{0.5} g(u) du + \int_{0.5}^{1} g(u) du.$$

Note that this $E[g(δ_{r,h})]$ is different from the $E[g(δ_{r,B})]$ in the statement of the proposition because $r_{B,h}$ is fixed (for now) rather than drawn from a distribution on some $S_{i}$. A simple calculation of the derivatives for $r_{B,h}$ shows that this function is strictly convex in $r_{B,h}$ so that it is maximized at either $r_{B,h} = 0$ or $r_{B,h} = 0.5$. In both cases, $E[g(δ_{r,h})] \leq \frac{1}{2} \int_{0}^{0.5} g(u) du$. If, on the other hand, $r_{B,h} \in S_{S}$ then $E[g(δ_{r,h})] = \frac{1}{2} \int_{0.5}^{1} g(u) du$ or, by substituting $v = r_{B,h} - u$,

$$E[g(δ_{r,h})] = \frac{1}{2} \int_{r_{B,h} - 0.5}^{r_{B,h}} g(v) dv,$$

with derivative for $r_{B,h}$ equal to

$$\frac{dE[g(δ_{r,h})]}{dr_{B,h}} = \frac{1}{2} [g(r_{B,h} - 0.5) + g(r_{B,h})] > 0$$

so that $E[g(δ_{r,h})] \geq \frac{1}{2} \int_{0}^{0.5} g(u) du$. It follows that, for fixed $r_{B,h}$, $E[g(δ_{r,h})]$ is always larger when $r_{B,h} \in S_{S}$ than when $r_{B,h} \in S_{i}$.

This implies immediately the first part of the lemma by letting $h = M$. Moreover, by integrating over, respectively, $S_{i}$ and $S_{S}$, it also implies the second part of the lemma, which completes this proof. □

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