



## Are perks purely managerial excess? <sup>☆</sup>

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### Abstract

A widespread view is that executive perks exemplify agency problems—they are a route through which managers misappropriate a firm's surplus. Accordingly, firms with high free cash flow, operating in industries with limited investment prospects, should offer more perks, and firms subject to more external monitoring should offer fewer perks. The evidence for agency as an explanation of perks is, at best, mixed. Perks are, however, offered in situations in which they enhance managerial productivity. While we cannot rule out the occasional

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aberration, and while we have little to say on the overall level of perks, our findings suggest that treating perks purely as managerial excess is incorrect.

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## 1. Introduction

Some firms offer their executives enormous perquisites or “perks.” NorthWestern, a cash-strapped utility based in South Dakota, which had suspended its dividend, yet was scheduled to spend \$450,000 in 2003 on the use of a corporate jet by its newly appointed CEO, on top of a \$565,000 salary, \$600,000 signing bonus, and up to \$423,000 in potential incentives. In contrast, the CEO of pharmaceutical giant AstraZeneca proudly states, “We use normally scheduled flights. You’ll see me at the airport like everyone else.”<sup>1</sup> Why do some firms offer employees such lavish perks instead of giving employees more choice and perhaps greater utility by giving them the monetary equivalent in additional pay?

By the term perk, we refer to forms of nonmonetary compensation offered to select employees. These range from the use of an executive jet or a chauffeur-driven car to a giant corner office and country club memberships. Implied in the definition is that the perk is not strictly necessary for the accomplishment of the employee’s duties (scheduled commercial flights are available or the executive only works out of a small portion of the office).

In fact, the leading theory of perks in the corporate finance literature, following Grossman and Hart (1980), Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Jensen (1986), is that they are a way for managers to misappropriate some of the surplus the firm generates. Managers can do so because perks are hard to observe by distant outsiders, and the value of perks is typically underreported to shareholders, if disclosed at all (there was public amazement at the size of the perks in former GE CEO Jack Welch’s retirement package and these came to light only through court documents filed by his wife during divorce proceedings).<sup>2</sup> Moreover, perks are one sign that the firm has a free cash flow “problem” with more cash than it knows how

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<sup>1</sup>From an article in USA Today, “Pricey Perks let Executives fly High”, August 5, 2003.

<sup>2</sup>Securities and Exchange Commission disclosure rules require that perquisites worth more than a certain value must be reported as other annual compensation in the proxy statement for the five-highest paid executives. However, compliance and perquisite valuation vary across firms. For example, AIG discloses no costs of perks provided to management, stating they are a business expense that facilitates the performance of management responsibilities (USA Today, Aug 5, 2003). As another example, Warren Buffet recognized shareholder sensitivity to excessive perks in his response to a reporter about Berkshire Hathaway’s acquisition of a corporate jet, named “The Indefensible.” He responded, “I put it in our annual report in the tiniest type I could find. So, I kind of tip-toed into the arena.” (The Age, September 24, 2002).

to spend (Jensen, 1986), so excessive perks are typically only the tip of an iceberg of wasteful corporate practices such as overinvestment and lax management. Legions of theoretical papers have been written in which managers extract value through perks.

Despite the theoretical and popular focus on managerial excess as the explanation for why some firms offer so much more in terms of perks than others, there are other, more benign, explanations. While perks have been excoriated in the popular press, some may well help managers in the performance of their duties, i.e., they aid productivity even if they are not strictly necessary for the performance of the manager's duties. For instance, a firm may benefit if its senior executives arrive fresh to a crucial negotiation after traveling by corporate jet rather than arriving tired and jet-lagged after traveling in economy class. A senior executive may not be willing to pay out of his own pocket for executive jet travel if it were not offered as a perk since his private value for it may be far smaller than the benefit to the company. Hence, payment via perk rather than via monetary compensation. There are also other benign explanations that we will explore.

Our objective in this paper is to examine whether there is systematic evidence in favor of either the malign or benign interpretations of the use of perks as compensation. To do this, we use a detailed database of job descriptions of top managers and their perk and compensation structures in over 300 large U.S. firms tracked over a period of up to 14 years. Since there is so little work on perks, we document the nature of perks offered to Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and divisional managers across firms as well as how they change over time.

We then test the implications of the theories we outline. Since there is limited time variation in perks in our sample, we focus on the cross-sectional variation. Broadly speaking, even though in some industries or in individual firms perks may be a form of excess, the systematic evidence in favor of existing theories of perks as private benefits is mixed at best. Moreover, there is systematic evidence for other explanations—primarily, that perks appear to be used when they contribute to improved managerial productivity. In particular, time-saving perks are far more common in settings in which the time saved is the greatest, and for employees whose time is most valuable. For example, we find that company planes are less common in firms headquartered in counties with larger populations and in firms headquartered in close proximity to larger airports, but more common in firms with operations that are more geographically dispersed.

The closest paper to this work is Yermack (2004), who studies the use of corporate jets by business executives on personal account. Few would deny that the use of company planes for shuttling one's family or friends for golf or shopping trips, without revealing the full extent to shareholders, is a misuse of firm resources. It is interesting but not surprising therefore that when such actions are revealed to the shareholder, there is a measurable negative stock price reaction. More surprising is that shareholders penalize managers more than could be accounted for by the value of benefits consumed, suggesting that shareholders draw broader inferences about the managers' trustworthiness from such data.

Yermack's paper focuses on uncovering more egregious misuse and its consequences. Our paper is different in two respects. First, the possession of

corporate jets itself has come to be associated with excess (the canonical example being RJR Airforce popularized in [Burroughs and Helyar, 2003](#)). Thus, it is also important to see whether perks such as jets could also have a business purpose that is justifiable—that is, we focus on overall use rather than just use for personal reasons. Second, we would like to determine whether there are well-defined patterns in the data, consistent with the theories, that can explain who uses perks. Our paper does not rule out the possibility that the occasional firm manager may abuse perks, and consequently should be consistent with Yermack's results. However, the systematic patterns we observe in the data are consistent with a more responsible use of perks in business. Furthermore, we find theories of agency that suggest certain patterns have very mixed success when taken to the data. This suggests that we need to rethink whether perk consumption should be the canonical example of systematic forms of agency (such as the agency costs of free cash flows) as has been suggested in the past.

## 2. Theories and their implications

We start by outlining theories of why firms might offer perks and the patterns they predict in the data. Let us begin with the most benign view, namely, that perks could enhance productivity.

### 2.1. *Perks and productivity*

The firm may benefit more than the individual manager by offering management perks. For instance, a manager who arrives fresh after traveling in First Class on a transatlantic flight may be much better positioned to negotiate a multibillion dollar contract than one who has been cramped in Economy class. The manager may not internalize the full value to the firm of being fresh, so he might prefer a cheaper form of travel if the firm did not pay for it.

It may also be more cost effective (in a broad sense) for the firm to provide some perks. The presence of an executive dining room obviates the need for executives to spend time away from work traveling to lunch. The dining room (or the coffee machine) may also increase serendipitous encounters among top executives, fostering greater communication. Finally, the firm may enjoy scale economies in providing a perk to its employees. For all these reasons, it may be cheaper for the firm to provide the perk than to have employees make individual uncoordinated choices.

The conjecture that perks are awarded so that the firm can enhance the productivity of its employees leads to a number of empirical implications.<sup>3</sup> First, more productive employees should get more perks. Second, in situations in which the time saved by a perk is particularly high, more perks should be provided. Finally, since time-saving is most valuable to the most productive employees, perks should

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<sup>3</sup>In the absence of more sophisticated models, we do not distinguish between productivity-enhancing and cost-minimizing perks. The key distinction between productivity and private benefits explanations is that productive perks increase firm value, while perks that are private benefits do not.

increase disproportionately to such employees when the potential for time-saving increases.

## 2.2. *Perks and private benefits*

Now consider the detailed implications of theories that suggest perks are private benefits.<sup>4</sup> An immediate question is why perks and not pay? After all, would managers not prefer more fungible pay that they can use as desired? The answer has to be that perks are the preferred form of compensation because managers can get away with them more easily than with higher pecuniary pay—perhaps because the full value of perks is less likely to be disclosed to investors and investors are usually not in physical contact with management, so that they cannot see the extent of perk consumption for themselves.

Jensen (1986) points out that it is easier for managers to spend money on themselves in mature firms with few growth prospects (they have little by way of productive alternative investment) and substantial free cash flows (they do not have to go outside to raise resources from questioning investors). So perk consumption should be negatively related to the firm's growth prospects, and positively related to the "free" cash the firm generates. According to Jensen, it is the combination of low investment opportunities and high cash flow that is particularly conducive to perk consumption. Of course, since perks are a form of compensation, it is important to correct for performance in checking whether free cash matters.

If perks are primarily a form of private benefit, better-governed firms will offer managers lower perks. Also, if perks are easier to pay because they are not disclosed, perks should be disproportionately more valuable to CEOs who disclose pay than to lower-level managers who don't. Again, these effects should be most pronounced for firms that are prone to waste.

While the above are the leading explanations for perks, there are others.

## 2.3. *Perks and status*

Perks may also be a form of status or positional good (Hirsch, 1976) that reinforces an employee's standing in the organization. In the colorful words of compensation expert Graef Crystal,<sup>5</sup>

We don't wear crowns in this country or carry such symbols of office as a field marshal's baton. So it is hard to tell the players apart, to spot the chairman of the board in a crowd. He's the one wearing the Saville Row suit, but you have to be

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<sup>4</sup>Hart (2001) defines perks as nonpecuniary benefits such as "fancy offices, private jets, the easy life, etc.... that are attractive to management but are of no interest to shareholders—in fact they reduce firm value. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that they are inefficient in the sense that one dollar of perks reduces firm value by more than a dollar." Conceptually, perks as private benefits implies that the financial cost of the perk exceeds the associated productivity gain. Perks as private benefits are distinct from pecuniary forms of compensation in that they are not transferable (or difficult to transfer).

<sup>5</sup>Crystal (1978) cited in Evans (1984).

knowledgeable about clothes to pick him out. You're more certain when you see him go by in a chauffeur driven limousine. Or when you are ushered into his office, which is of such size that you think the New York Knicks must use it for practice in off-hours.

More prosaically, employees may care both about their standing and the fact that it is well known within the organization. Unlike an employee's pay, which is not widely known within the firm (except for the top managers whose pay is publicly disclosed), the fact that an employee has a chauffeur-driven car or that he uses the corporate jet is widely seen and noticed by other employees within the firm. If relative standing within the firm is an important element of the utility derived from compensation (see Frank, 1985a,b), then perks can motivate far more cost-effectively than equivalent amounts of cash. In fact, even if everyone's compensation were disclosed, perks may still play an additional role in conveying status. There are only so many corner offices or so many places on the corporate jet, and who gets them can signal the recipient's place in the pecking order better than cash compensation can (which is subject to noise of its own).

The army recognizes these sorts of motivation well by giving out medals for bravery that have a value far greater than the metal they are stamped on.<sup>6</sup> But this raises a number of questions. First, why can corporations not invent their own medals or ribbons, which will cost them virtually nothing, instead of paying with perks? In truth, most perks do not cost much relative to managerial compensation, so they may in fact be ribbons. Second, why does the CEO need perks—after all, everyone knows who he is and how much he earns. One explanation may be that the CEO needs to be offered perks (in fact, the most perks) so as to legitimize the status attached to the perk: a prestigious country club membership would not convey as much status for other executives if the CEO did not belong to it. Finally, if perks are rationed by the firm to convey status, it becomes clear why employees cannot be allowed to bid for them with their own money—the entire status value of medals for bravery would be lost if one could simply buy them at Macys. Moreover, the firm could head off a perk race and gross overinvestment by determining allocations itself.

If perks are meant to enhance status, they are likely to be used in organizations that emphasize status by carefully delineating positions. Large firms are more likely to have well-defined hierarchies, so they are likely to have more perks (though they are also likely to have scale economies in offering perks). Also, the steeper the hierarchy, the more likely perks are to be used at the top.

#### 2.4. *Perks and taxes*

Finally, we have taxes. Some perks (such as a beautiful office) may be seen by the employee as a form of compensation, but may not be taxed as such by the Internal

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<sup>6</sup>Napoleon Bonaparte, the great French military commander, marveled at the motivational power of a small piece of ribbon (a decoration): "If I had enough ribbon, I could conquer the world."

Revenue Service. Thus they may be a tax-advantaged way to pay. One way of testing for this is to verify whether perks are more likely to be offered in states that have higher marginal taxes.

## 2.5. *Summary*

We outline above a number of explanations for why some firms pay their employees with perks rather than their monetary equivalent. Our explanations are not mutually exclusive. In fact, they may be mutually reinforcing. For instance, the firm could let the CEO signal his status by paying him more and letting him indulge in “conspicuous consumption” (see Veblen, 1899; Frank, 1985a,b; Bagwell and Bernheim, 1996). But it may be cheaper to pay him with a perk that performs the dual role of enhancing his productivity on the job and letting him signal. Our endeavor here is to determine whether the private benefit explanation accounts in reasonable measure for the patterns in the data, and if not, what other explanations are tenable. Our aim is not, however, to arrive at a monocausal explanation.

## 3. **Data description**

### 3.1. *Sample description*

The primary dataset used in this study includes a panel of more than 300 publicly traded U.S. firms over the years 1986 to 1999, spanning a number of industries. The data are collected from a confidential compensation survey conducted by Hewitt Associates, a leading human resources consulting firm specializing in executive compensation and benefits. The survey is the largest private compensation survey (as measured by the number of participating firms) and is comprehensive in that it collects data on more than 50 senior and middle management positions including both operational positions (e.g., Chief Operations Officer and Divisional CEO) and staff positions (e.g., Chief Financial Officer and Head of Human Resources).

The survey typically covers all the positions at the top of the hierarchy and a sample of positions lower down. In this study, we use a subset of the survey’s benchmark positions: Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Divisional Manager (DM). The data for each position include all components of compensation including salary, bonus, restricted stock, stock options, and other forms of long-term incentives (e.g., performance units) as well as a list of perks made available to that position. To ensure consistency in matching these positions across firms, the survey provides benchmark position descriptions and collects additional data for each position including: job title, number of employees under the position’s jurisdiction, the title of the position that the job reports to (i.e., the position’s boss), and the number of reporting levels between the position and the board of directors.

We believe the survey data are accurate for several reasons. First, Hewitt personnel are knowledgeable about survey participants because they are typically assigned to specific participants for several years. Furthermore, while the

participating firms initially match their positions to the benchmark positions in the survey, Hewitt personnel follow up to verify accuracy and spend an additional eight to ten hours on each questionnaire evaluating the consistency of responses with public data (e.g., proxy statements) and across years. Finally, participants have an incentive to match positions correctly and provide accurate data because they use the survey results to set pay levels and design management compensation programs.

We supplement the survey data with information from several other data sets: Compustat for financial information, CDA Spectrum for institutional shareholdings, Directory of Corporate Affiliations for year of founding, U.S. Census Bureau for data on county population and travel time to work, U.S. Department of Transportation for commercial flights by airport, and the U.S. Federation of Tax Administrators for marginal state tax rates. While the Hewitt survey is conducted in April of each year and the perk data describe the firm in the year of survey completion, some statistics (e.g., number of employees in the firm) represent the end of the most recent fiscal year. To maintain consistency, we match the supplemental data sets using the year prior to the year of the survey. Finally, not all variables are available for all positions, firms, and years, and due to limitations in matching with the supplemental data sets, our samples are smaller for some parts of the analysis.

In [Table 1](#), we present descriptive statistics for the firms in the sample. While the data set includes more than 300 firms, the exact number varies over the period, as firms enter and exit as survey participants. The firms in the sample are large, well established, and profitable, with an average size of approximately 44,000 employees, age of 93 years since founding, and operating return on assets of 16.7%. The typical firm in the sample is thus a large, mature, and stable firm. The sample firms span many industrial sectors of the economy, with some concentration in the food, paper, chemical, machinery, electrical, transportation equipment, instrumentation, communications and utilities industries.

### 3.2. *Sample representativeness*

Clearly, an important issue in datasets such as this one is the question of sample selection and whether the firms in the dataset are distinctive from, or representative of, employers of similar size in their industry. The survey participants are typically the leaders in their sectors and, in fact, more than 75% percent of the firms in the data set are listed as Fortune 500 firms in at least one year and more than 85% are listed as Fortune 1,000 firms. In general, Hewitt survey participants also participate in other compensation consulting firm surveys (e.g., Hay Associates, Mercer, Towers Perrin, to name a few), primarily to receive information about pay practices to use as a competitive benchmark in evaluating their own compensation programs. It is important to note that the sample includes many more firms than those in Hewitt's consulting client base, with at least 50% of the firms as survey participants with no client relationship to Hewitt.

We evaluate the representativeness of our sample by comparing key financial measures of our survey participants to a matched sample from Compustat. We begin by matching each firm in the Hewitt data set to the Compustat firm that is closest in

Table 1  
Summary statistics

AGE is the number of years since firm founding as reported by the Directory of Corporate Affiliations. POPULATION is the number of people in thousands in the county in which the firm is headquartered. FLIGHTS is defined as the annual number of departing flights in a given year from airports within a 50-mile radius of the center of the county in which the firm is headquartered. TRAVEL as the median travel time to work in number of minutes for workers residing in the county in which the firm is headquartered. DISTANCE is defined as the logarithm of the sum of the distance between the location of headquarters and each division in the firm (i.e., the number of miles between the county of the location of headquarters and the most-populated county in the state of the division's location). CASHFLOW is defined as operating income before depreciation minus the sum of interest, taxes paid, and capital expenditures all divided by beginning-of-year assets. MARKET-TO-BOOK RATIO (industry-adjusted) is defined as the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets in a given year minus the three-digit SIC industry average, where market value of assets equals the book value of assets plus the market value of common equity less the sum of the book value of common equity and balance sheet deferred taxes. GROWTH is defined as the average three-digit SIC industry growth in the rate of investment (capital expenditures divided by lagged assets) in the future three periods. JENSEN and HIGRLoCF are indicator variables for firms in the lowest quartile of industry growth/highest quartile of cash flow, and highest quartile of industry growth /lowest quartile of cash flow, respectively, in a given year. BCDUM is an indicator variable equal to one for the year in which the state of incorporation for the firm adopts a Business Combination law and the years following. FRACTINST is the fraction of shares owned by institutional shareholders with more than 5% ownership. SPAN is the number of positions reporting to the CEO (see Rajan and Wulf, 2003). STATETAX is the highest marginal state tax rate in 2003 as published by the Federation of Tax Administrators.

Variable	Mean	STD	Min	Max	Firm- yrs (N)
Firm size (000's employees)	43.82	69.38	0.94	825.00	2355
Sales (\$M)	7752.46	12656.70	121.65	153627.00	2369
Return on assets	0.167	0.078	-0.071	0.965	2359
Firm age (years since founding)	93.0	38.0	1.0	197.0	1107
Population by County of headquarters (000's) (POPULATION)	1645.8	1999.4	21.5	9329.9	2405
Annual flights within 50 Mile radius of headquarters (000's) (FLIGHTS)	328.8	275.8	0	961.7	2393
Median travel time to work in county of headquarters (TRAVEL)	24.6	3.9	16.0	33.9	2369
Sum of distance between headquarters & each division (DIVISION)	2001.2	2995.5	0.0	17665.8	2425
Cash Flow	0.040	0.070	-0.319	0.539	2108
Market-to-book ratio (industry-adjusted)	-0.261	1.122	-4.577	3.788	2308
Growth (industry growth in rate of investment)	-0.053	0.119	-0.650	0.575	2418
Jensen (low growth/ high cashflow)	0.077	0.267	0.000	1.000	2124
High growth/ low cashflow (HIGRLoCF)	0.070	0.255	0.000	1.000	2124
Business combination law (BCDUM)	0.84	0.37	0.000	1.00	2311
Fraction owned by institutions (FRACTINST)	0.083	0.102	0.000	0.648	1908
Presence of large institutional shareholder (LARGEINST)	0.179	0.384	0.000	1.000	1908
Number of positions reporting to CEO (SPAN)	5.5	2.6	1.0	14.0	2425
State income tax rate-highest marginal rate (%) (STATETAX)	4.2	3.6	0.0	9.3	2405

sales within its two-digit SIC industry in the year the firm joins the sample. We then perform Wilcoxon signed rank tests to compare the Hewitt firms with the matched firms. While the firms in the Hewitt data set are, on average, slightly larger in sales than the matched sample, we find no statistically significant difference in employment and profitability (return on sales). The Hewitt firms are larger in sales than the matched sample of firms because in a number of cases, the Hewitt firm is the largest firm in the industry thus forcing us to select a matched firm smaller in size. We also find no statistically significant difference in sales growth, employment growth, or annual changes in profitability for all sample years. In sum, while the Hewitt firms are larger (measured by sales) on average than the matched sample, there is little additional evidence that these firms are not representative of the population of industrial firms that are leaders in their sectors.

We also calculate financial measures for the sample of Compustat firms with 10,000 employees or greater over the period from 1986 to 1999 (excluding firms operating in financial services). We find that, on average, survey participants are more profitable, but grow at a slower rate relative to the sample of large Compustat firms. Specifically, the sample average return on sales for survey participants is 17.8% versus 15.7% for the sample of large Compustat firms, and the average sales growth is 5.7% vs. 7.4%. This is consistent with our observation that the firms in our sample are likely to be industry leaders (hence slightly more profitable) and also large (hence the slightly slower growth). There is no reason why this should dramatically skew the inferences from the sample.

To summarize, the survey sample is probably most representative of Fortune 500 firms.

### 3.3. *Perk measures*

As part of the annual compensation survey, Hewitt includes a section on perquisites in which they request detailed information on approximately 15 categories of perks. The term perquisite can represent several types of employee benefits including time off without pay, executive services, nonperformance awards, healthcare, survivor protection, and retirement coverage.<sup>7</sup> Perks covered by the Hewitt survey are primarily executive services (e.g., company plane, chauffeur service, financial counseling), with only a few classified as nonperformance awards (e.g., loans) and healthcare (e.g., hospital examination). A list and description of the perquisites covered in the 1995 survey are included in the Appendix.

Detailed information is collected for each perk including (i) eligibility criteria, e.g., number of domestic employees eligible and pay of the lowest position eligible, (ii) limitations, e.g., conditions for use of the company plane (i.e., when the plane can be scheduled without higher-level approval), and (iii) charge for use.<sup>8</sup> Finally, the survey includes a perquisites eligibility table that asks the respondent to indicate

<sup>7</sup>Categories outlined in [Ellig \(1981\)](#) for purposes of tax discussion.

<sup>8</sup>In a paper related to charges for use, [Marino and Zabojsnik \(2004\)](#) derive optimal pricing contracts for firms offering discounts and benefits to employees.

Table 2

Perquisites for CEO and divisional manager positions (1986–1999)

Each CEO perk variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the position is offered the perk in a given year and zero otherwise. Each divisional manager perk variable is the proportion of divisional managers within the firm that are offered the perk in a given year. TRAVEL3 is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm offers access to the company plane, chauffeur service, and a company car to the CEO and zero otherwise; CLUB3 for country, lunch, and health club memberships, and FINANCIAL3 for financial planning, tax preparation, and estate planning. CEO-Divisional Manager Differential is the difference between the CEO perks and the proportion of divisional manager perks within the firm in a given year. The differential takes the value of one when the CEO receives the perk and no divisional manager does and zero when both the CEO and all of the divisional managers receive the perk or when no position receives the perk.

Perquisite	CEO		Divisional manager (DM)		CEO-divisional manager differential		Firm-yrs <i>N</i>
	Mean (i)	STD (ii)	Mean (iii)	STD (iv)	Mean (v)	STD (vi)	
Company plane	0.66	0.47	0.31	0.46	0.35	0.48	2352
Chauffeur service	0.38	0.49	0.06	0.25	0.32	0.47	2352
Company car	0.56	0.50	0.46	0.48	0.10	0.34	2352
Travel package (TRAVEL3)	0.17	0.38	0.02	0.12	0.16	0.36	2352
Country club membership	0.47	0.50	0.29	0.45	0.19	0.42	2352
Lunch club membership	0.48	0.50	0.32	0.45	0.17	0.36	2352
Health club membership	0.17	0.38	0.12	0.32	0.05	0.22	2352
Club package (CLUB3)	0.12	0.33	0.07	0.24	0.06	0.23	2352
Financial counseling	0.70	0.46	0.50	0.48	0.21	0.38	2352
Tax preparation	0.65	0.48	0.46	0.48	0.20	0.38	2352
Estate planning	0.59	0.49	0.42	0.48	0.17	0.36	2352
Financial package (FINANCIAL3)	0.52	0.50	0.34	0.46	0.18	0.37	2352

which perks, if any, are provided to each survey position including multiple incumbents. We use the data from the eligibility table to construct our perk measures.

For each perk, we create an indicator variable equal to one if the perk is offered to the employee and zero otherwise. Note that unlike Yermack (2004), we do not focus on perks used for personal purposes only.

An alternative measure is the Hewitt valuation of each perk. However, valuation is not as precise as one might desire and while valuations provide some useful comparative benchmarks to survey participants, they suffer from significant measurement error. Because of these limitations, we use measures that simply indicate whether a perk is offered (or not offered) to a position in a given year.

In this study, we focus on two positions, namely, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Division Manager (DM). The CEO is the highest executive in the corporation and the Division Manager is the highest authority in the division, which is defined as the “lowest level of profit center responsibility for a business unit that engineers, manufactures, and sells its own products.” For a thorough description of both of these positions, see Rajan and Wulf (2003). We primarily analyze CEO perks with the unit of observation in the CEO data set being a perk offering to a CEO in a given year. The divisional manager perk variable is equal to the proportion of divisional managers within the firm receiving the perk. We also construct a perk differential measure that captures perk differences across the hierarchical levels within the firm. Using the company plane as an example, we construct a CEO-DM differential by subtracting the proportion of divisional managers with access to the plane from the CEO company plane indicator variable. A value of one in this example means that the CEO has access to the company plane while no divisional manager does. Perk differentials defined in this way ignore the variation in the economic difference of the divisional manager positions across firms. While we report the raw differentials in Table 2, we control for differences in the relative importance of divisional managers across firms by including average division size in the differential regressions in Tables 5–7.

#### 4. Facts about perks

We start by reporting summary statistics on a number of perks including company plane, chauffeur service, company car, club memberships (country, lunch, health), and individual financial counseling (financial planning, tax preparation, estate planning). We also group the perks into three packages: travel perks, club membership perks, and financial counseling perks.<sup>9</sup> We define *TRAVEL3* as an indicator variable equal to one if a firm offers access to the company plane, chauffeur service, and a company car to the CEO. Analogously, we define *CLUB3* for country, lunch, and health club memberships and *FINANCIAL3* for financial planning, tax preparation, and estate

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<sup>9</sup>Oyer (2004) uses similar “package” measures in analyzing employee benefits.

planning. We focus on these perks because they are potentially the most valuable to the executive, most costly to the company, and they have been consistently defined in all years in the survey.<sup>10</sup> Ultimately, we sharpen our focus to company plane, which scores high on all these attributes and has the additional merit of being the canonical example of an excessive perk.

Table 2 presents summary statistics for the perks for CEO and Divisional Manager (DM) positions and the differential between the CEO and Divisional Manager. The CEO has access to the company plane in 66% of the firm-years, enjoys chauffer service in 38%, and receives a company car in 56% of the firm-years; 17% of the firms offer all three travel perks to the CEO (column (i)). Almost half of the firms offer country club memberships to their CEOs (47%), while 48% offer lunch club memberships, 17% offer health club memberships, and 12% offer all three club membership perks. Finally, individual financial counseling for the CEO is quite common: 70% obtain financial planning assistance, 65% tax preparation, and 59% estate planning; 52% are offered all three types of financial counseling.

In comparison to CEOs, divisional managers (column iii) are much less likely to have access to the company plane (30% vs. 66%) or receive chauffer services (6% vs. 38%), but the probabilities are much closer for the company car (46% vs. 56%).<sup>11</sup> The differences in incidence of club memberships or financial counseling services between divisional managers and CEOs are not as great as those in planes and chauffer services (29% vs. 47% for country club; 32% vs. 48% for lunch club; 34% vs. 52% for the financial counseling package).

An obvious question to ask is what is the relation between pay and perks? Are high-paying firms more likely to offer perks? In general, the answer is yes. The logarithm of CEO salary plus bonus is positively correlated with access to the company plane (correlation coefficient = 0.30 ( $p$ -value = 0.000)), chauffer service (0.28 (0.000)), club memberships (0.05 (0.009)), and financial counseling (0.20 (0.000)), but negatively correlated with a company car (−0.06, (0.002)). Of course these relations might be explained by firm size, performance, or industry effects—larger, better-performing firms in given industries pay more and also grant more perks. To evaluate this, we regress the logarithm of CEO salary plus bonus on firm size, market-to-book ratio (industry-adjusted), and industry and year indicators, and we estimate comparable regressions with each perk as the dependent variable (again controlling for size, market-to-book, industry, and year). The correlations of the residuals from these regressions are smaller, but similar to the raw correlations listed above, with one exception: pay and company car are

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<sup>10</sup>Other perks covered by the survey change slightly over time. For example, in earlier years, the types of company cars included luxury, full-size, and intermediate. In the last year of the survey, car types included super, luxury i, luxury ii, and full-size. Our company car measure is an indicator of whether any type of car is offered.

<sup>11</sup>Frank (1985a) argues that relative standing matters more than the absolute level of consumption with certain types of goods. In the example of the company plane, the CEO places more value on access to the company plane when the division manager does not have access.

now weakly positively correlated (0.02). So, on average, firms that pay well also perk well.<sup>12,13</sup>

Another interesting question is whether perk offerings have changed over time. One might imagine that perks have come under increased scrutiny with additional SEC disclosure requirements and pressure from the IRS to declare perks as taxable income.<sup>14</sup> With the caveat that our data do not allow us to distinguish between business and personal use, we find little variation in perks over the period in our sample. Focusing on CEO perks and limiting the sample to firms that appear for two consecutive years (to minimize bias from exit and entry), we find that access to a company plane decreases slightly on average over the period from 0.74 in 1987 to 0.64 in 1999. We see similar declines in chauffer service (decreasing from 0.40 to 0.31), company cars (0.58–0.49), and country club memberships (0.53–0.41), but an increase in the financial counseling package (0.45–0.56). The slow downward trend in most perk offerings is notable given that pay has been increasing substantially over this period.

The limited change over time in perks within firms suggests that cross-sectional analyses that explore the variation in perks across firms and across positions within firms might be more informative than the time-series changes.

One place to begin analysis of cross-sectional variation is to ask whether the propensity to offer perks differs across industries. In Table 3, we present the average of the sum of five perk indicators (*Sum5*) and each individual perk for the CEO: company plane, chauffer, company car, country club membership, and financial counseling package (*FINANCIAL3*). We include only industries in which we have 50 or more firm-year observations and rank the industries for the sum of CEO perks (rank of 1 is highest). Firms operating in the petroleum refining industry (SIC 29) offer the most CEO perks overall (rank of 1 in column ii) and rank the highest in each category (with the exception of company car). In contrast, firms operating in the machines and computers industry (SIC 35) offer the fewest CEO perks (rank of 14). To evaluate the exclusivity of perks to CEOs by industry, we turn to the industry ranks of the sum of the five perk differentials. Again, the petroleum refining industry

<sup>12</sup>Yermack (2004) finds no statistically significant relation between use of perks on personal account and “excess” compensation defined as the residual from CEO total pay regressed on firm size, CEO tenure, stock performance, and industry and year indicators. He also finds no relation between use of perks on personal account and CEO fractional ownership.

<sup>13</sup>Also, individual perks offered to the CEO are positively correlated within firms: for example, planes and chauffer service (correlation coefficient = 0.28), chauffer and country club memberships (0.12), and planes and country club memberships (0.10). We find similar correlations among divisional manager perks.

<sup>14</sup>While our data do not allow us to distinguish between business and personal use, the change in disclosure requirements might have an effect on overall trends. The SEC adopted more stringent disclosure requirements (effective January, 1993) for all pay components of the top five-highest paid executives. In this new ruling, perks worth more than \$50,000 or 10% of the executive’s total salary and bonus must be disclosed as other compensation in the proxy statement, and any perquisite worth more than 25% of the total of these extras must be detailed in a footnote. The stated purpose of the new rules is to “provide shareholders with a clear and concise presentation of compensation paid or awarded to executive officers, and the directors’ bases for making such compensation decisions.”

Table 3  
 CEO perquisites by industry  
 Industries represented include only those with 50 or more firm-year observations. Sum 5 is the sum of CEO perk indicators for company plane, chauffeur service, company car, country club membership, and financial counseling (FINANCIAL3). Industries are ranked by Sum 5 with rank of 1 being the highest. Refer to Table 2 for additional variable definitions.

SIC	Industry	Sum5	Rank	Company plane	Chauffeur	Company car	Country club	Financial counseling	Firm-yrs
		(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)	(v)	(vii)	(viii)	
29	Petroleum refining	4.03	1	1.00	0.80	0.37	0.93	0.93	59
48	Communications	3.57	2	0.91	0.59	0.73	0.50	0.85	119
37	Transportation equip.	3.27	3	0.90	0.38	0.68	0.54	0.77	201
20	Food	3.27	4	0.86	0.51	0.63	0.39	0.87	165
13	Oil & Gas extraction	3.12	5	0.85	0.31	0.53	0.81	0.62	68
28	Chemical	3.07	6	0.72	0.68	0.51	0.41	0.75	407
38	Instrumentation	2.82	7	0.61	0.38	0.57	0.44	0.81	127
36	Electronic equipment	2.70	8	0.76	0.29	0.53	0.50	0.63	128
73	Business services	2.70	9	0.42	0.40	0.79	0.60	0.49	53
33	Primary metals	2.61	10	0.68	0.04	0.58	0.63	0.68	71
49	Utilities	2.53	11	0.52	0.23	0.65	0.51	0.62	134
26	Paper	2.46	12	0.92	0.32	0.23	0.36	0.64	132
30	Rubber & misc. plastics	2.40	13	0.59	0.19	0.49	0.44	0.68	63
35	Machines & computers	1.76	14	0.36	0.12	0.33	0.30	0.65	249

ranks the highest in the average of the difference between CEO and divisional manager perks, and firms in the machines and computers industry rank the lowest (rank of 14) (unreported). It is interesting that the industry singled out by Jensen in his seminal 1986 paper as a canonical example of corporate excess caused by free cash—the oil and gas industry—seems to have a very high level of perks and also a high differential.

To summarize, we find that CEOs receive more perks than lower-level managers within firms. This is not surprising since CEOs are also paid more. Across firms, we find that high-paid CEOs are more likely to receive perks. The perks in our sample of firms do not vary much over time. We also find important differences in industry-specific perk practices, with oil and gas firms being more likely to offer perks and machine and computer firms being less likely. We now turn to regression analysis.

## 5. Analysis

### 5.1. Testing for productivity

We begin with the explanation that perks are offered to enhance the productivity of recipients. To evaluate the evidence in favor of productivity, we turn to two time-saving perks, the company plane and chauffeur service. Managers that operate larger firms should receive additional time-saving perks because their time is more valuable (e.g., Rosen, 1982). In addition to firm size, the location of a firm's headquarters has implications for perks improving CEO productivity. In particular, the use of company planes may be more efficient for firms located far from airports relative to those in close proximity to airline hubs. Also, chauffeur service may be more efficient for CEOs that face longer commute times.<sup>15</sup>

In Table 4, we estimate probit regressions of perks related to travel. In column (i) we begin with the company plane indicator as the dependent variable and include the logarithm of the number of employees in the firm. Since large airports, airline hubs, and thus convenient commercial flights are more easily accessible in large urban areas, we include the logarithm of population for the county in which the firm is headquartered.

Population by county is the number of people in thousands for the county in which the firm is headquartered. Population figures are those reported by the U.S. Census Bureau in the years 1990 and 2000 (interleaving years are extrapolated using the annual growth rate between these years). We also include industry and year indicators, cluster errors by firm, and report estimates of marginal coefficients

<sup>15</sup>For an analysis of establishments offering employee benefits to ease employee costs of working long hours, see Oyer (2004). He finds support for the complementarity between effort and benefits in which harder working employees are more likely to receive time-saving benefits (or benefits that reduce disutility from working additional hours). For example, workers who work more than full-time are more likely to receive employer-provided meals.

Table 4

Testing for productivity—probit regressions of CEO travel perquisites

Coefficients are marginal effects evaluated at the mean on the probability that the firm provides the perk. Company Plane (COPLANE) is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO has access to a company plane and zero otherwise. Chauffer Service (CHAUFFER) is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is provided chauffer service and zero otherwise. All specifications include both industry (two-digit SIC) and year indicator variables. FIRM SIZE is defined as the logarithm of the number of employees in the firm. POPULATION is defined as the logarithm of the number of people in thousands in the county in which the firm is headquartered. FLIGHTS is defined as the logarithm of the annual number of departing flights in a given year from airports within a 50-mile radius of the center of the county in which the firm is headquartered. TRAVEL is defined as the median travel time to work in number of minutes for workers residing in the county in which the firm is headquartered. All specifications report robust standard errors by clustering by firm and all variables are winsorized at the 99th percentile. \*\*\*/\*\*/\* represent significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.

Dependent variable	(i) Company plane	(ii) Company plane	(iii) Chauffer service	(iv) Chauffer service
FIRM SIZE	0.205*** (0.029)	0.192*** (0.030)	0.162*** (0.031)	0.173*** (0.032)
POPULATION	-0.113*** (0.027)		0.117*** (0.034)	
FLIGHTS		-0.089*** (0.028)		
TRAVEL				0.045*** (0.009)
SIC indicators	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year indicators	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2146	2073	2165	2129
(pseudo) <i>R</i> -squared	0.356	0.355	0.284	0.318

(evaluated at the mean).<sup>16</sup> The coefficient on firm size is positive and significant. A one-standard deviation increase in the logarithm of the number of employees is associated with an increase of 24.6% in the probability of a firm offering a company plane. The coefficient estimate for log of county population is indeed negative and statistically significant ( $t = -4.41$ ), with a one-standard deviation increase in population being correlated with a decrease of 12.4% in probability. Larger firms are more likely to operate a company plane and firms headquartered in more populated counties are less likely to do so.

Certainly, we would expect counties with high populations to also be near airports with lots of scheduled flights that offer choice of timing and destination. To test this further, we construct a more refined measure of commercial flight accessibility by using data for the largest 200 airports in the U.S. We define *FLIGHTS* as the logarithm of the annual number of departing flights in a given year from airports within a 50-mile radius of the center of the county in which the firm is

<sup>16</sup>We report robust standard errors by clustering by firm to address both heteroskedasticity and non-independence of errors within firms across time.

headquartered. The data source for the number of flights and airport location is the U.S. Department of Transportation T-100 database. The data source for the longitude and latitude of county centers is from the U.S. Census Bureau. We calculate the spherical distance between airport locations and county centers as specified by both longitude and latitude coordinates. In Table 4 column (ii), we include this measure in place of county population in the earlier regression. The coefficient estimate on the number of flights is negative and statistically significant ( $t = -3.28$ ) and the magnitude of the association is economically significant. A one-standard deviation increase in the number of flights is correlated with a decrease of 10.3% in the probability of a firm offering a company plane. CEOs that work in headquarters located in close proximity to larger airports are less likely to have access to a company plane. This evidence supports the productivity explanation of why firms provide CEOs access to corporate jets.

Turning to our other perk that is directly related to travel; chauffeur service, firms that are headquartered in more populated areas should be more likely to offer chauffeur service to CEOs in order to increase productivity during their commute. We define *CHAUFFEUR* as an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO has access to chauffeur service and zero otherwise. In Table 4 column (iii), we regress *CHAUFFEUR* on the log of firm employees, the log of population for the county in which the firm is headquartered, and industry and year indicators. The coefficient estimate on firm size is positive and significant: larger firms are more likely to offer chauffeur service. Moreover, the coefficient estimate on population is now positive and highly significant ( $t = 3.43$ ). Larger firms and firms headquartered in more populated counties are more likely to offer chauffeur service to their CEOs. The difference in the sign of the estimated coefficient on county population in explaining air travel from that in explaining chauffeur service suggests we are not simply picking up the effects of some omitted variable associated with county population.

While county population of headquarters should be positively correlated with the length of the CEO's commute, we construct a more refined measure by defining *TRAVEL* as the median travel time to work in number of minutes for workers residing in the county in which the firm is headquartered. In Table 4 column (iv), we include this measure in place of county population in the earlier regression. The coefficient estimate on *TRAVEL* is again positive and highly statistically significant ( $t = 5.07$ ).<sup>17</sup> CEOs that work in headquarters located in either larger counties or counties with longer median commute times are more likely to have access to

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<sup>17</sup>The data source for the median travel time to work is the U.S. Census Bureau. We use data reported from the 1990 and 2000 surveys, and based on the average annual growth rate over the decade, we extrapolate data for the intervening years and the years prior to 1990. The ideal measure for our purposes is the travel time for individuals who work in a county instead of those who reside in a county. This measure probably understates the commuting time for many CEOs because in some counties, the proportion of those living in a county that also work in a county is low. For example, New York City headquartered firms draw many people from surrounding suburbs and not many NYC residents work outside of the city, so median travel time for NYC residents will understate travel time for NYC workers.

chauffeur service. This evidence strongly supports the productivity explanation of why firms provide CEOs with chauffeur service.<sup>18</sup>

Let us explore the productivity explanation for access to a company plane further. A company plane should be more prevalent in firms with geographically dispersed operations. If all of the divisional offices and the majority of the firm's employees work at headquarters, this should reduce the CEO's travel needs. In contrast, if a firm's divisions are geographically dispersed, the productivity argument for a company plane is more compelling. We know the state of location for each division that is reported in the Hewitt survey, so we construct a measure of a firm's geographic dispersion based on this information. We define *DISTANCE* as the sum of the distance between the location of headquarters and each division in the firm (i.e., the number of miles between the county of the location of headquarters and the most-populated county in the state of the division's location). Unfortunately, we only know the state of location of the division and cannot determine divisional proximity to large airports. In Table 5 column (i), we regress *COPLANE* on the logarithm of number of employees, the logarithm of the county population of the headquarters, the logarithm of *DISTANCE*, and year indicators. We include industry indicators in column (ii). The coefficient on *DISTANCE* is positive and significant in both regressions, suggesting that more geographically dispersed firms are more likely to offer a company plane to their CEO even when controlling for firm size. A one-standard deviation in *DISTANCE* is associated with a 6.1% increase in the probability of a firm offering access to a company plane.<sup>19</sup>

To further refine the tests, we focus on two categories of firms: (i) firms that would enhance CEO productivity the most by offering a company plane—represented by an indicator (*DISPERSED\_FAR*) if a firm is above median distance and below median proximity to larger airports (*FLIGHTS*), and (ii) firms that would enhance productivity the least—represented by an indicator (*CONCENTRATED\_CLOSE*) if a firm is below median distance and above median proximity to larger airports. In a regression (not reported) with these two indicators and controls for firm size, industry, and year indicators, we find a positive and significant coefficient on *DISPERSED\_FAR* and a negative and significant coefficient on *CONCENTRATED\_CLOSE*. Firms with the greatest opportunity to enhance productivity are more

<sup>18</sup>While the company car is a travel perk, it is not directly related to productivity (although driving in a nicer car is more comfortable, thereby making longer hours less distasteful to busy managers). We find that company car is not correlated with firm size. However, this is confounded by the fact that chauffeur and company car might be substitutes for CEOs.

<sup>19</sup>Another finding that supports the productivity argument is that the offer of a company plane to the CEO is positively correlated with sales per employee. If we regress sales/employee on the company plane indicator, firm size, and industry and year indicators, the coefficient on *COPLANE* is positive and significant. We find a similar result if we replace *COPLANE* in this regression with an "excess plane" measure defined as the residual from a regression that controls for plane demand (proxied by population and distance). These findings are the opposite of that found by Yermack (2004) and are further evidence that our perk measures of plane use are different.

Table 5

Testing for productivity—probit regressions of CEO access to company plane

Coefficients are marginal effects evaluated at the mean on the probability that the firm provides the perk. Company Plane (columns i–iii) is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO has access to a company plane and zero otherwise. CEO-DM Company Plane Differential (column iv) is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO has access to a company plane and no Divisional Manager has access and zero otherwise. All specifications include both industry (two-digit SIC) and year indicator variables. FIRM SIZE is defined as the logarithm of the number of employees in the firm. POPULATION is defined as the logarithm of the number of people in thousands in the county in which the firm is headquartered. DISTANCE is defined as the logarithm of the sum of the distance between the location of headquarters and each division in the firm (i.e., the number of miles between the county of the location of headquarters and the most-populated county in the state of the division's location). DIVISION SIZE is defined as the log of the average number of employees for divisions within a firm. All specifications report robust standard errors by clustering by firm and all variables are winsorized at the 99th percentile. \*\*\*/\*\*/\* represent significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.

Dependent variable	(i) Company plane	(ii) Company plane	(iii) Company plane	(iv) CEO-DM company plane differential
FIRM SIZE	0.159*** (0.026)	0.206*** (0.030)	1.027*** (0.377)	0.147*** (0.030)
POPULATION	-0.079*** (0.025)	-0.116*** (0.030)	0.047 (0.076)	-0.005 (0.025)
DISTANCE	0.036*** (0.014)	0.029** (0.014)	0.031** (0.014)	0.060*** (0.016)
FIRM SIZE*POPULATION			-0.059*** (0.027)	
DIVISION SIZE				-0.066*** (0.024)
SIC indicators	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year indicators	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2195	1982	1982	2031
(pseudo) R-squared	0.166	0.387	0.400	0.197

likely to offer plane access to their CEOs, while firms with the least opportunity are less likely. Put differently, access to a company plane is more likely in a setting in which the time saved is the greatest.

A more subtle implication of the productivity hypothesis is that more time-saving perks should be offered to managers who are more productive. A number of economists argue (see, for example, Calvo and Wellisz, 1979; Rosen, 1982) that heads of larger units are likely to be more productive both because more talented managers are hired to head larger units and because their decisions impact more people at the margin. One measure of the productivity of a manager is therefore the size of the unit they head. So we should see that being more distant from a large airport should make it more likely that CEOs of larger firms should have access to a company plane. Therefore, we include interactions between firm size and population. We find the coefficients on the interaction to be negative and significant as expected (Table 5 column (iii)).

Finally, the perk differential between the CEO and the divisional manager should increase in the size of the firm and decrease in the size of the unit headed by the divisional manager. Moreover, it should increase as the travel needs of the CEO increase. In Table 5 column (iv), we regress the company plane differential on firm size, population, distance, division size, and industry and year indicators. We find that the differential goes up in the size of the firm and falls in the average size of the division, consistent with the productivity explanation. We also find a positive and significant coefficient for *DISTANCE*, suggesting that greater travel demands for CEOs warrant substantially different access to the company plane.

As we mention earlier, pay and perks are positively correlated. Since they are jointly determined, we could obtain biased coefficients if we include pay directly. However, the omission of pay may also bias our results. While we choose to exclude pay in our reported regressions, the results are qualitatively similar when we include the logarithm of CEO salary plus bonus.

In sum, there is evidence in support of the productivity explanation. Company planes are less common in firms that are headquartered in counties with larger populations and less common in firms that are in close proximity to larger airports. They are also more common in firms with operations that are more geographically dispersed. Larger firms are more likely to offer access to the company plane when the time saving entailed for their CEO is more substantial. Larger firms tend to offer more plane access to CEOs relative to divisional managers, though the differential is lower when divisional managers run larger units. Finally, the differential is larger when the firm operations are more geographically dispersed, which makes sense because the CEO is likely to travel more.

## 5.2. Testing for private benefits

We turn now to evaluating Jensen's free cash flow hypothesis, which states that consumption of private benefits should be larger in firms with lots of free cash that

Table 6

Testing for private benefits—probit regressions of CEO access to company plane

Coefficients are marginal effects evaluated at the mean on the probability that the firm provides the perk. Company plane (columns i–iii and v) is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO has access to a company plane and zero otherwise. CEO-DM Plane Differential (column iv) is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO has access to a company plane and no Divisional Manager has access and zero otherwise. FIRM SIZE is defined as the logarithm of the number of employees in the firm. CASHFLOW is defined as operating income before depreciation minus the sum of interest, taxes paid, and capital expenditures, all divided by beginning-of-year assets. MARKET-TO-BOOK RATIO (industry-adjusted) is defined as the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets in a given year minus the three-digit SIC industry average, where market value of assets equals the book value of assets plus the market value of common equity less the sum of the book value of common equity and balance sheet deferred taxes. GROWTH is defined as the average three-digit SIC industry growth in the rate of investment (capital expenditures divided by lagged assets) in the future three periods. JENSEN and HIGHLOCF are indicator variables for firms in the lowest quartile of industry growth + highest quartile of cash flow, and highest quartile of industry growth + lowest quartile of cash flow, respectively, in a given year. FRACTINST is the fraction of shares owned by institutional shareholders with more than 5% ownership. DIVISION SIZE is defined as the log of the average number of employees for divisions within a firm. All specifications report robust standard errors by clustering by firm and all variables are winsorized at the 99th percentile. <sup>\*\*\*</sup>/<sup>\*\*</sup>/<sup>\*</sup> represent significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.

Dependent variable	(i) Company plane	(ii) Company plane	(iii) Company plane	(iv) CEO-DM plane differential	(v) Company plane
FIRM SIZE	0.199 <sup>***</sup> (0.032)	0.160 <sup>***</sup> (0.026)	0.199 <sup>***</sup> (0.031)	0.163 <sup>***</sup> (0.030)	0.207 <sup>***</sup> (0.033)
CASH FLOW	-0.307 (0.383)	-0.330 (0.406)	-0.010 (0.021)	0.026 (0.022)	-0.014 (0.022)
MARKET-TO-BOOK RATIO	-0.007 (0.020)	0.012 (0.021)			
GROWTH		0.609 <sup>***</sup> (0.137)			
CASHFLOW*GROWTH		-5.711 <sup>***</sup> (2.043)			
Low Growth/ High CF (JENSEN)			0.001 (0.059)	-0.041 (0.056)	0.068 (0.066)

High Growth/ Low CF (HiGRLoCF)					
FRACTINST (Fraction Held by Institutions)	0.136 <sup>***</sup> (0.041)	0.170 <sup>***</sup> (0.055)	0.034 (0.085)		
Low Growth/ High CF (JENSEN)*FRACTINST			(0.262)		
High Growth/ Low CF (HiGRLoCF)*FRACTINST			-1.206 <sup>**</sup> (0.514)		
DIVISION SIZE			0.545 (0.522)		
SIC Indicators	Yes			-0.068 <sup>***</sup> (0.024)	Yes
Year Indicators	Yes	No		Yes	Yes
Observations (pseudo) R-squared	1891 0.321	Yes 2066 0.143		Yes 1879 0.176	1524 0.328

operate in industries with limited investment opportunities. In these tests, we focus on the company plane as the canonical example of an excessive perk.<sup>20</sup>

We begin by analyzing the relation between a firm's free cash flow and the use of a company plane. Of course, to include a measure of free cash flow, we have to deduce how much cash is truly free; accounting can obscure this. We measure free cash flow (*CASHFLOW*) as lagged operating income before depreciation minus the sum of interest, taxes paid, and capital expenditures all divided by beginning-of-year assets.<sup>21</sup>

We expect compensation to increase in performance. If we do not correct for performance, an observed positive correlation between free cash and perks could simply reflect the fact that better performance is rewarded than the fact that free cash flow is being misused. As a measure of a firm's performance, we include an industry adjusted market-to-book ratio for the firm defined as the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets in a given year minus the three-digit SIC industry average.<sup>22</sup> In Table 6 column (i), when we include both of these measures in addition to firm size and industry and year indicators, the coefficient estimates on free cash flow and market-to-book are negative, but both are insignificant.

A more subtle implication of Jensen's hypothesis is that perk consumption should be greatest in firms that are generating free cash *and* operating in industries with weak investment prospects. Executives in these "Jensen-type" firms are the most likely to be extracting firm surplus through private benefits. To test this, we compute industry investment opportunities (*GROWTH*) in a given year as follows. We average the percentage change in a firm's rate of investment (capital expenditures divided by lagged assets) in the future three periods for all firms in Compustat. We then average this prospective growth rate across three-digit SIC industries to obtain *GROWTH* for each industry.

In Table 6 column (ii), we include this industry measure directly, *CASHFLOW*, and an interaction term between this measure and firm cash flow while controlling for firm size, market-to-book, and year indicators.<sup>23</sup> The coefficient estimate on

<sup>20</sup>Our data do not allow us to distinguish between perks that are for business purposes versus perks that are for personal use. However, it seems reasonable to assume that there is some relation between the two. At minimum, owning a corporate jet is necessary (but not sufficient) to granting personal use. Refer to Yermack (2004) for a detailed study of the personal use of corporate jets based on disclosures in company proxy filings. Yermack discusses in detail five possible scenarios under which firms may avoid disclosing the use of the corporate plane for personal travel with one possibility being that companies choose not to disclose personal aircraft use as a prerequisite if at least some part of a plane trip involves business.

<sup>21</sup>Free cash could be thought of as the cash left after necessary and pre-committed expenses and investments. We calculate two measures of free cash, one that subtracts capital expenditures and one that does not. The measure used in the reported regressions is the former and is defined as lagged operating income before depreciation (data 13)—interest (data 15)—taxes paid [taxes (data 16)—change in deferred taxes (data 74)]—capital expenditures (data 128) all divided by beginning-of-year assets (data 6). All results are robust to the alternative measure of free cash flow that doesn't subtract capital expenditures.

<sup>22</sup>The market value of assets equals the book value of assets plus the market value of common equity less the sum of the book value of common equity and balance sheet deferred taxes.

<sup>23</sup>We exclude industry indicators from this specification because our measure of growth is an industry measure. If we included industry indicators, we would only pick up the time series variation in *GROWTH* plus the differences between three-digit SIC categories (used to define *GROWTH*) and three-digit SIC indicators.

*GROWTH* is positive and significant ( $t = 4.44$ ). Firms in industries that are investing at a growing rate also seem to invest more in providing company planes to their CEOs. It may be that these firms have more access to funds or it may be that CEO time is more valuable in these firms. The coefficient estimate on the interaction term is negative and significant ( $t = -2.80$ ), which deserves further investigation.

The negative coefficient on the interaction term could mean either slow growth firms with high cash flow have more perks or high growth firms with low cash flow have more perks. The former would be consistent with Jensen, the latter not. To test this, we construct an indicator (*JENSEN*) for “Jensen-type” firms, i.e., those in the lowest quartile of growth and the highest quartile of cash flow in a year. We also construct an indicator (*HiGrLoCF*) for firms in the highest quartile of growth and the lowest quartile of cash flow.<sup>24</sup>

In Table 6 column (iii), we include the two indicators while controlling for firm size, market-to-book, and industry and year indicators. The coefficient estimate for *JENSEN* is insignificant. Notably, the coefficient estimate for *HiGrLoCF* is positive and significant ( $t = 3.32$ ). Firms operating in high growth industries and that generate low levels of free cash flow are 13.6% more likely to offer CEO access to the company plane.

A more subtle prediction of private benefits—since perks are easier to hide from shareholders and CEOs disclose pay while divisional managers do not—is that CEOs should get greater access to the company plane relative to divisional managers, i.e., divisional managers can get paid through pay while CEOs can get paid through corporate jet travel (both on company and personal account). So, one implication of the free cash flow hypothesis is that Jensen firms should have a higher differential. We estimate a specification similar to that in column (iii) but with the CEO-DM company plane differential as the dependent variable. We also include the average of the logarithm of division employees to control for differences in the importance of divisional managers across firms. In Table 6 column (iv), we find a positive and significant coefficient estimate on the *HiGrLoCF* indicator ( $t = 3.09$ ) and a negative, but not significant, coefficient on the *JENSEN* indicator.

Thus, growing firms offer more perks, especially firms that are growing but not financing through internal cash flow. The latter also offer their CEOs relatively more perks, unlike Jensen-type firms. Our findings are somewhat in contradiction to the spirit of the free cash flow hypothesis, but may well reflect a form of agency (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), where by managers of growing firms financed from outside are less careful with other people’s money.

If perks reflect some sort of agency problem, we should see that better external governance leads to lower perks. We compute two measures of governance. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1986), large shareholders should prevent

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<sup>24</sup>For completeness, we also include indicator variables for firms in the highest quartiles of growth and cash flow and the lowest quartiles of growth and cash flow. The coefficients on these indicators are insignificant (unreported) and the regression results are not qualitatively different when the indicators are excluded. Also, the results are qualitatively similar when we include both cash flow and *GROWTH* directly in the regressions in addition to the *JENSEN* and *HiGrLoCF* indicators; for exposition, we exclude cash flow and growth in the reported regressions.

managers from consuming excessive private benefits. So, one measure of good governance is *FRACINST*, the fraction of the firm's stock held by institutions with greater than 5% ownership in the prior year. Another measure is *LARGEINST*, an indicator if the firm has an institutional investor owning 10% or more of the firm's stock in the prior year. Again, we include interactions between these governance variables and the two firm type indicators (as well as the indicators directly).

In Table 6 column (v) we find a negative, but insignificant, coefficient estimate on *FRACINST* and positive, but insignificant, coefficient estimates on *JENSEN* and *HiGRLoCF*. Most notably, we find a negative and significant coefficient estimate on the interaction term between *JENSEN* and *FRACINST* ( $t = -2.35$ ), but no significance on that between *HiGRLoCF* and *FRACINST*. These results are qualitatively similar in an analogous regression using the other measure of governance, *LARGEINST* (not reported). So, on average, we find no direct relation between governance and access to corporate jets and no direct effect of being a Jensen firm. Yet, in these Jensen firms, we find that better governance is associated with a lower incidence of plane ownership. However, we find no association between governance and high growth, low cash flow firms (*HiGRLoCF*).

The bottom line is that we do not see a pattern that is fully consistent with a free cash flow explanation or a broader agency explanation. Some firms offer more perks but these are not the firms predicted by the free cash flow hypothesis. On the other hand, governance does seem to be associated with lower perks in free cash flow firms but not in the firms earlier identified as having more perks than the norm.

Yermack (2004) finds that disclosure of the personal use of the corporate jet has a strong negative announcement effect on the firm's stock price. Furthermore, it leads to long-term underperformance. He also finds a negative relation between sales per employee and the use of a corporate jet for personal purposes. This is more suggestive of agency than our findings, though the forms of agency suggested by his results include both greed as well as incompetence. It may well be that the personal use of corporate jets is a strong signal of agency problems, even though the general use of corporate jets is a much weaker signal, so our findings are not incompatible. But he also finds no relation between perks used for personal purposes and CEO ownership, a measure of "excess compensation," and measures of external monitoring such as board size, fraction of outside directors, institutional investor ownership, and the degree of analyst coverage. These results tend to suggest that even if there is an agency problem, typical remedies seem to have little impact on the problem. This raises some questions about whether perks, even excessive personal use of them, should be treated as canonical examples of our most important theories of agency (such as the agency cost of free cash flow, Jensen, 1986).

Before concluding this section, consider an alternative explanation for Yermack's and our inability to find strong evidence consistent with agency: endogeneity. Firms that have more serious agency problems are more likely to have greater outside monitoring so that, on average, there is a very noisy relation between measures of agency such as perk consumption and measures of outside monitoring.

One way to address this is either to examine the effects of exogenous changes in governance on perks or to use predetermined measures of governance as explanatory

variables. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000) propose changes in state takeover laws (the adoption of Business Combination (BC) laws strengthened the power of boards to resist disciplinary takeovers) as an exogenous change in governance. For our sample of firms, we determine the state of incorporation as listed by Compustat and create an indicator variable equal to one for the year in which the state adopts a BC law and the years following. In a regression of *COPLANE* on the BC indicator, firm employees, cash flow, market-to-book, growth, state of incorporation indicators, and industry and year indicators, we find an insignificant coefficient on the BC indicator. A second possibility is to use measures of governance that are largely predetermined like the ones in Gompers et al. (2003). Their “governance index” has little explanatory power for the cross-sectional distribution of perks.

### 5.3. Discussion of productivity and private benefits

Let us now turn to simultaneously evaluating the evidence supporting the productivity and private benefits explanations. In the regressions in Table 7, we include both productivity and private benefit measures to evaluate the robustness of the statistical significance and the relative magnitude of the association between these measures and company plane access. We estimate the same basic regressions as in Table 6, but also include population as a proxy for airport proximity and geographic dispersion or distance as a proxy for travel demand in each regression. In Table 7 columns (i) through (iv), the sign and significance of almost all coefficient estimates are qualitatively similar to the earlier analyses presented in Tables 5 and 6. Hence, we conclude that the earlier results are robust to regressions that include both productivity and private benefits variables.

## 6. Alternative explanations

Of course, there are other explanations for the variation in perks across firms, two of which we mentioned earlier: firms may use perks to enhance the status or authority of the recipient and perks may be a tax-advantaged form of compensation. In Table 8, we evaluate the evidence for these alternative explanations by analyzing five perks: company plane, chauffeur services, company car, country club membership, and a financial package (financial planning, tax preparation, and estate planning). We first include a measure of the flatness of a firm’s hierarchy in the basic regression (i.e., including controls for firm size, population, distance, and industry and year indicators): *SPAN* represents the breadth of hierarchy or the span of control and is defined as the number of positions that report directly to the CEO (developed in Rajan and Wulf, 2003).

We also include a measure of income tax rates. Since different states have different income tax rates, executives living in high-tax states may value perks they would otherwise have to buy (with after-tax dollars) more than those living in low-tax states. Of course, this assumes the personal use and value of the perk is not fully disclosed to the tax authorities, which is, ultimately, an empirical question. We

Table 7

Testing for productivity and private benefits—probit regressions of CEO access to company plane  
 Coefficients are marginal effects evaluated at the mean on the probability that the firm provides the perk. Company Plane (columns i–iii) is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO has access to a company plane and zero otherwise. CEO–DM Plane Differential (column iv) is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO has access to a company plane and no Divisional Manager has access and zero otherwise. FIRM SIZE is defined as the logarithm of the number of employees in the firm. POPULATION is defined as the logarithm of the number of people in thousands in the county in which the firm is headquartered. DISTANCE is defined as the logarithm of the sum of the distance between the location of headquarters and each division in the firm (i.e., the number of miles between the county of the location of headquarters and the most-populated county in the state of the division’s location). CASHFLOW is defined as operating income before depreciation minus the sum of interest, taxes paid, and capital expenditures all divided by beginning-of-year assets. MARKET-TO-BOOK RATIO (industry-adjusted) is defined as the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets in a given year minus the three-digit SIC industry average where market value of assets equals the book value of assets plus the market value of common equity less the sum of the book value of common equity and balance sheet deferred taxes. GROWTH is defined as the average three-digit SIC industry growth in the rate of investment (capital expenditures divided by lagged assets) in the future three periods. JENSEN and HIGRLoCF are indicator variables for firms in the lowest quartile of industry growth + highest quartile of cash flow, and highest quartile of industry growth + lowest quartile of cash flow, respectively, in a given year. FRACTINST is the fraction of shares owned by institutional shareholders with more than 5% ownership. DIVISION SIZE is defined as the log of the average number of employees for divisions within a firm. All specifications report robust standard errors by clustering by firm and all variables are winsorized at the 99th percentile. \*\*\*/\*\*/ represent significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.

Dependent Variable	(i) Company plane	(ii) Company plane	(iii) Company plane	(iv) CEO–DM plane differential
FIRM SIZE	0.204*** (0.031)	0.156*** (0.027)	0.202*** (0.031)	0.160*** (0.031)
POPULATION	-0.121*** (0.030)	-0.088*** (0.027)	-0.119*** (0.030)	-0.014 (0.026)
DISTANCE	0.030** (0.014)	0.036** (0.014)	0.030** (0.014)	0.065*** (0.017)
CASHFLOW	-0.414 (0.378)	-0.508 (0.403)		
MARKET-TO-BOOK RATIO	0.004 (0.021)	0.019 (0.023)	-0.002 (0.023)	0.033 (0.022)

GROWTH	0.551 <sup>***</sup>		
	(0.137)		
CASHFLOW <sup>*</sup> GROWTH	-4.313 <sup>**</sup>		
	(2.181)		
Low growth/ high CF (JENSEN)	-0.006		-0.044
	(0.066)		(0.057)
High growth/ low CF (HiGRLoCF)	0.101 <sup>**</sup>		0.165 <sup>***</sup>
	(0.047)		(0.056)
DIVISION SIZE			-0.065 <sup>**</sup>
			(0.025)
SIC indicators	No	Yes	Yes
Year indicators	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1934	1747	1796
(pseudo) R-squared	0.181	0.387	0.207

Table 8

Testing for status and tax explanations—probit regressions of CEO perquisites

Coefficients are marginal effects evaluated at the mean on the probability that the firm provides the perk. FIRM SIZE is defined as the logarithm of the number of employees in the firm. POPULATION is defined as the logarithm of the number of people in thousands in the county in which the firm is headquartered. DISTANCE is defined as the logarithm of the sum of the distance between the location of headquarters and each division in the firm (i.e., the number of miles between the county of the location of headquarters and the most-populated county in the state of the division's location). SPAN is the number of positions reporting to the CEO (see Rajan and Wulf, 2003). STATETAX is the highest marginal state tax rate in 2003 as published by the Federation of Tax Administrators. Each CEO perk variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the position is offered the perk in a given year and zero otherwise. FINANCIAL COUNSELING is an indicator equal to one if financial planning, tax preparation, and estate planning are all offered to the CEO (FINANCIAL3). All specifications report robust standard errors by clustering by firm and all variables are winsorized at the 99th percentile. \*\*\*/\*\*/\* represent significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.

Dependent variable	(i) Company plane	(ii) Chauffeur service	(iii) Company car	(iv) Country club membership	(v) Financial counseling
FIRM SIZE	0.215*** (0.030)	0.158*** (0.032)	-0.060* (0.032)	-0.048* (0.028)	0.045 (0.029)
POPULATION	-0.121*** (0.030)	0.122*** (0.035)	0.102*** (0.035)	0.051* (0.029)	0.034 (0.028)
DISTANCE	0.032** (0.014)	0.015 (0.018)	0.019 (0.017)	0.060*** (0.017)	-0.026 (0.017)
STATETAX	-0.011 (0.008)	0.009 (0.010)	0.024** (0.010)	0.018** (0.009)	0.024*** (0.008)
SPAN	-0.018** (0.008)	-0.010 (0.009)	0.017 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.008)	0.013 (0.009)
SIC indicators	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year indicators	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1982	2030	2027	2073	2097
(pseudo)-R-squared	0.397	0.279	0.144	0.127	0.095

cannot distinguish between business and personal use—the former is not taxable, while the latter is. We preliminarily evaluate the empirical merit of this argument by including *STATETAX*, defined as the highest marginal state income tax rate for 2003 (published by the Federation of Tax Administrators) for the state in which the firm is headquartered.

In the company plane regression in Table 8 column (i), the coefficient on *SPAN* is negative and significant. Steeper firms, or firms with narrower spans of control, are more likely to give access to a company plane even controlling for firm size. These are also firms that delegate less responsibility and for which the CEO is more remote from employees (see Rajan and Wulf, 2003). A plane is a very conspicuous perk—at least to employees of the firm who see the CEO travel or hear about it—which may serve to consolidate the CEO's status in the eyes of distant employees and allow his orders to be obeyed more readily. The coefficient for span in the regression with chauffer as the dependent variable is also negative but not significant while it is weakly positive for company car. While one could argue that company cars do not signal status as much as the use of a corporate jet or a chauffer-driven car, the evidence is admittedly weak. The fact that financial counseling seems unrelated to span is, however, consistent with the theory, for these are not perks that are likely to enhance status.

Turning to state marginal tax rates, we find positive and significant coefficients on *STATETAX* in the regressions for company car, country club memberships, and financial counseling (columns (iii)–(v)) and insignificant coefficients in the plane and chauffer regressions (columns (i)–(ii)). A one-standard deviation increase in state tax rates is associated with approximately a 7% increase in the probability of offering a company car, country club memberships, or financial counseling. The fact that the coefficient is insignificant for company plane or chauffer is consistent with the tax hypothesis. Employees may not value a corporate jet or a chauffer as compensation since they would not “buy” them out of their pay if given a choice, but may indeed value the company paying for cars, country clubs, and financial counseling. These findings are indeed suggestive that perks, especially routine ones, may be offered as a tax advantaged (i.e., easier for the firm to claim as business expense) form of payment.<sup>25</sup>

## 7. Conclusion

Overall, we do not see a systematic pattern that is fully consistent with a free cash flow explanation or a broader agency explanation of perks. The firms that offer more perks are not those predicted by the free cash flow hypothesis and while governance

<sup>25</sup>It may also be that the personal use of a plane or a chauffer are better disclosed so they are not good ways to compensate if the objective is tax minimization. Similarly, one could argue that financial services for employees may be hard to pass off as a business expense. An alternative explanation for the positive coefficient on marginal tax rates is that financial counseling (which includes tax planning) might be higher in states with higher tax rates simply because they are more valuable to the recipient.

does seem to be associated with lower perks in Jensen-type firms, it has no such association in “perk-intensive” firms. In contrast, there is more systematic evidence of other (not necessarily mutually exclusive) explanations—especially perks as a means to enhance productivity. More productive employees at the top of a firm’s hierarchy are more likely to receive perks. Time-saving perks are more common in settings in which the time saved by the perk is higher and more frequently offered to the most productive employees as the potential for time-saving increases.

The narrow implication of these findings is that a blanket indictment of the use of perks is unwarranted. The broader implication is that nonmonetary forms of compensation need far more careful investigation. This is therefore a call for further study.

### **Appendix. Perquisite Descriptions—1995 Hewitt survey**

Company plane: The ability to *schedule* the company plane, *not* merely use it on a space-available basis.

Chauffer service: Chauffer service exclusively for executives, over and above general limousine service for business travel (e.g., to and from the airport).

Club memberships: Company-paid memberships in luncheon, country, and health (athletic) clubs. Does *not* include company-sponsored membership available to broad groups of employees.

First-Class air travel: The opportunity to travel first class on an unlimited basis or under certain specified conditions.

Airline VIP club memberships: Company-paid memberships in airline VIP clubs (e.g., Red Carpet, Ambassador, or Admiral Club).

Spouse travel: The opportunity for spouses to accompany executives on business trips on a company-paid basis.

Company car: Company cars provided to executives and managers only. Does *not* include car policy for sales personnel.

Executive dining room: Executive dining facilities that are separate and apart from those provided for the broad-based employee group.

Individual financial or tax counseling/ estate planning/ income tax preparation: Any type of individual, one-on-one financial counseling, income or gift tax return preparation, tax planning, and financial counseling.

Financial seminars: Seminars conducted for small groups of executives or managers. Such seminars are distinguishable from financial counseling by the lack of individually tailored recommendations.

Physical examinations: Routine physicals, comprehensive hospital examinations, and cardiovascular examinations.

Home security systems: Company-provided systems for executives’ homes such as fire alarms, burglar alarms, or generators for use in power failures.

Loans: Loans provided to executives at below-market interest rates (with or without restrictions). Does *not* include relocation loans or loans available from a tax-qualified retirement plan.

Cellular car telephone or other mobile communications equipment: Company-provided car telephone equipment for use by the executive for business and personal calls.

Home use of company WATS line for personal calls: Ability to access company WATS lines for personal calls from the executive's home.

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